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INTRODUCTION 
On March 28, 2011, as US warplanes participated in an 
international campaign to protect civilians in Libya from the 
wrath of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, President Barack Obama 
addressed the nation to explain America’s role in the Libyan 
conflict.1 Inaction as atrocities that “stained the conscience of 
the world” were being perpetrated by forces loyal to Libya’s 
longtime tyrant would have betrayed both America’s values and 
“our responsibilities to our fellow human beings,” the President 
declared.2 Slightly over two years later, on August 26, 2013, 
Secretary of State John Kerry decried the use of chemical 
weapons against civilians in Syria, which “should shock the 
conscience of the world,” and called on the international 
community to “stand up to assure that there is accountability” 
for this heinous crime.3 In the ensuing weeks, the world 
witnessed an international diplomatic rollercoaster that brought 
the United States to the brink of military action against the 
Assad regime and compelled Syria to surrender its chemical 
weapons stockpiles to international control.4  
As is customary for Middle Eastern conflicts, the Libyan and 
Syrian crises presented America and the world with innumerable 
                                                                                                                                     
1. The international intervention to protect civilians in Libya was undertaken 
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1973. See S.C. Res. 1973, para. 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
2. Barack Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President in Address 
to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript). 
3. John Kerry, Secretary of State, United States, Remarks on Syria (Aug. 26, 2013), 
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213503.htm. 
4. On September 27, 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2118 
demanding the immediate destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and 
promising punitive action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in case of non-
compliance by any of the warring parties in the Syrian civil war. S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
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policy and legal challenges. Constitutional lawyers debated 
whether America’s involvement in the Libyan civil war complied 
with the War Powers Resolution,5 and pundits of every political 
persuasion evaluated the Obama Administration’s posture 
towards the Syrian civil war.6 Meanwhile, for some 
commentators, a resurgent Russia actively protecting its regional 
interests and allies was reminiscent of bygone Cold War days,7 
while for others the American and European response to these 
conflicts reflected the diminishing global influence of the west 
and portended a drift towards a politically “anchorless world.”8 
Beyond the particularities of these crises, the human 
suffering they wrought, and the intricate questions of law and 
policy they raised, for some scholars the fact that the 
international community did not condone the terrorizing of 
civilians by tyrannical regimes is symptomatic of a profound shift 
in the nature of international law and the structure of 
international relations. Regardless of the form and efficacy of 
efforts to protect civilians in any particular conflict, the 
emergence and increasing potency of the global concern for the 
safety, security, and welfare of human beings everywhere,9 
evinces a transformation in the dominant norms of international 
affairs. The salient feature of this transformation, it is argued, is 
the systematic humanization of international law, which makes 
                                                                                                                                     
5. See, e.g., Trevor Morrison, Libya, ‘Hostilities’, The Office of Legal Counsel, and the 
Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2011). 
6. In support of President Obama’s policy regarding the Syrian civil war, see 
Jeffrey Goldberg, From Iran To Syria, Obama’s Toughness Is Paying Off, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Sept. 20, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-20/from-iran-to-
syria-obama-s-toughness-is-paying-off.html. For critical views of the Administration’s 
positions, see Thom Shanker & Lauren D’Avolio, Former Defense Secretaries Criticize 
Obama on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/
world/middleeast/gates-and-panetta-critical-of-obama-on-syria.html. 
7. David Kenner, How Putin Turned Moscow Back into a Middle East Powerhouse, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/13/
how_putin_turned_moscow_back_into_a_middle_east_powerhouse?page=0,1. 
8. Roger Cohen, An Anchorless World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/opinion/global/cohen-an-anchorless-world.html. 
9. For example, speaking before the Security Council after the adoption of 
Resolution 2118 on the situation in Syria, Secretary of State Kerry declared that 
measures taken against the Assad regime were reflective of the fact that “[a]s a 
community of nations, we reaffirm our responsibility to defend the defenseless.” John 
Kerry, Secretary of State, United States, Remarks at the United Nations Security 
Council (Sept. 27 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/
09/214890.htm). 
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the overarching purposes of the global legal order the 
upholding of human rights, the protection of human security, 
and the fulfillment of human needs.10 In short, human beings 
are being brought front and center, and thus displacing the 
state from its long unrivaled position as the principal actor and 
primary beneficiary of the legal regulation of international 
relations. 
This seismic shift from state-centrism to an individual-
focused global legal order is said to have had a deep impact on 
international law. Traditionally, the absence of either a central 
lawmaker or enforcer led international relations theorists to 
depict world affairs as an anarchic realm populated by coequal, 
mutually suspicious, sovereign states.11 In this dangerous world 
where survival and security are never guaranteed,12 the purpose 
of international law was conceived as being limited to 
minimizing violence and facilitating peaceful coexistence 
between states.13 The humanization of international law, 
however, is argued to be contributing to upending this image of 
the society of states and laying the foundations for the 
emergence of a global community of humankind. This is 
occurring through a multifaceted process of hierarchization. 
First, a set of predominantly humanitarian principles, drawn 
                                                                                                                                     
10. See generally Theodor Meron, International Law in the Age of Human Rights: 
General Course on Public International Law, 301 RECUEIL DES COURS 21 (2003). See also 
infra Part I. 
11. The canonical statement of this image of international relations is provided by 
Kenneth Waltz, who explained that unlike domestic orders where governments execute 
the lawmaking and law enforcement functions, “[t]he parts of international-political 
systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all others. 
None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are 
decentralized and anarchic.” KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 88 
(1979). 
12. As Robert Jervis explains, the anarchical nature of international relations 
causes international politics to degenerate into an “unrelenting struggle for survival, 
advantage, and often dominance.” Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation, 
INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1999, at 42, 45. 
13. This is why, as I detail below, scholars have identified what is called the 
“international law of coexistence.” This form of legal regulation emerges because in 
the absence of a central enforcer and in an environment where states are unsure about 
the intentions of other states there is always a potential for conflict that limits the 
possibilities for establishing and maintaining stable cooperative relations regulated by 
law between states. See John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 
INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5. 
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from international human rights,14 humanitarian,15 and criminal 
law,16 are recognized as occupying the normative apex of the 
international legal order. Second, an array of global and 
regional institutions are both challenging the state as the 
primary actor in international affairs and overseeing the 
implementation of these humanitarian principles. And third, 
the myriad forces of globalization coupled with the enmeshment 
of societies in webs of transnational relations heralds the 
emergence of a post-national global social consciousness 
predicated on common values and interests.17 
Expectedly, the reverberations of this putative process, 
frequently referred to as the constitutionalization of 
international law, have been felt throughout the global legal 
system. Many of the foundational principles of international law, 
such as sovereignty, non-intervention, the juridical equality of 
states, and state consent as the source of legal obligation are 
either radically revised or wholly discarded. More profoundly, 
the purpose underlying international law is said to have evolved 
beyond the limited objective of regulating relations between 
coequal sovereigns to protecting the rights, promoting the 
interests and values, and fulfilling the needs of an emergent 
global post-national community of humankind. This 
reconstitution of the global order also brings, or at least aspires 
to bring, inter-state competition and Great Power politics to an 
end,18 and to subject, or at least aspires to subject, world affairs 
to the rule of law. 
                                                                                                                                     
14. Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International 
Human Rights, 19 HUMAN RTS. Q. 703 (1997). 
15. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
201, 205 (1979); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 239 (2000); Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From War To Policing in 
the Regulation of Armed Conflict, in LAW AND WAR 48 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014). 
16. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 35–
37 (2d ed. 2013). 
17. See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of 
Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, 281 
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 42 (1999); see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law To 
Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005). 
18. Rosa Brooks, Transnational Security Advisors, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/transnational_security_advisors_
rice_power (arguing “that the age of great powers is coming to an end”). 
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One area of international law, on which this Article focuses, 
that is said to have evolved to reflect this ongoing process of 
humanization is jus ad bellum.19 All laws serve certain social 
purposes and policies,20 and in the case of jus ad bellum the rules 
and institutions constituting this field of law were designed to 
protect the security, independence, and territorial integrity of 
states through minimizing inter-state violence.21 The 
humanization of international law promises to overturn this 
conception of the purpose of jus ad bellum. In a humanitarian 
legal order serving the interests of a global community of 
humankind, the principal purpose for which armed force may 
be justifiably deployed is the protection of human, not state, 
security. 
At first glance, political and legal developments in the past 
twenty years may appear to corroborate claims that the 
humanization of international law is having a transformational 
impact on jus ad bellum. Armed interventions to protect civilians 
against mass atrocities in places like Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, 
Kosovo, and, most recently, Libya, in addition to efforts to end 
civil strife and bring the perpetrators of crimes against civilian 
populations to justice in war torn societies like the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, and now Syria, are all potentially 
suggestive of a humanitarian shift in jus ad bellum and, more 
broadly, in international law and politics.22 Moreover, the 
meteoric rise of the Responsibility to Protect (“RtoP”) as a 
                                                                                                                                     
19. Jus ad bellum is the area of international law that determines when states may 
resort to armed force in international relations. By focusing exclusively on jus ad bellum, 
I engage in an act of analytical isolation. This, as Frederick Schauer explains, means 
that “studying a part of law does not deny the connections between that part and the 
rest of law, and studying or even defining law as a whole does not deny the connections 
between law and everything else.” Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
361, 364 (1985). Therefore, I realize that the conclusions reached in this Article about 
jus ad bellum may not be completely valid for other fields of international law. 
20. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003) (“The 
Iowa law [enforcing a differential tax rate], like most laws, might predominantly serve 
one general objective . . . .”); see also HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 159 (1958). 
21. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY 4 (2011). 
22. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Humanitarian Crises, and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 48 INT’L J. 607 (1993) (observing that “in fact, human rights, and issues of 
humanitarian politics more generally, have achieved an international prominence at 
least as great as at any other time in modern history”). 
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policy framework to prevent egregious human rights violations,23 
and its subsequent invocation to justify a war waged to protect 
civilians in Libya, may provide further evidence of the 
emergence of a global community of humankind predicated on 
common humanitarian values.24 
In this Article, I challenge claims that the structure, 
substance, and ultimately, the social values and policy purposes 
underlying jus ad bellum are experiencing a paradigm shift. I 
argue that this vital field of international law has not, as many 
contend, undergone a process of humanization whereby its 
overarching objective has become the promotion, protection, 
and fulfillment of human security, rights, and interests. 
Furthermore, recent interventions undertaken for humanitarian 
purposes and doctrinal developments, such as the adoption of 
RtoP, do not portend a future trajectory of humanization. To 
the contrary, in this Article I show that the normative 
architecture and institutional infrastructure of the system of 
rules governing the resort to force continue to reflect statist, not 
humanitarian, values, and that the dominant understanding of 
security remains defined in terms of state, not human, security. 
To make this point, I show that although a unique 
opportunity arose to humanize jus ad bellum following the 1999 
Kosovo War, the international community purposively elected to 
keep the doctrinal and institutional components of jus ad bellum 
intact. As discussed below, the intervention by the National 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) to protect civilians in 
Kosovo was judged to be illegal because it was launched without 
the requisite UN Security Council authorization, but was widely 
lauded as legitimate because it served the humanitarian 
objective of saving innocent civilians from mass atrocities. In 
essence, the war had driven a wedge between a state-centric jus 
ad bellum and a humanitarian legitimacy that justified overriding 
                                                                                                                                     
23. Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 287 
(2011) (noting that since the concept of genocide, “no idea has moved faster in the 
international normative arena” than RtoP”). 
24. See Stewart Patrick, A New Lease on Life for Humanitarianism, FOREIGN AFF. 
(MAR. 24, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67674/stewart-patrick/a-new-
lease-on-life-for-humanitarianism?page=show; Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the 
People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSN’L L. 97, 138–45 (2013). 
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legal strictures to serve the higher purpose of protecting human 
lives. 
To bridge this gap between legality and legitimacy, various 
justifications for waging humanitarian war were proposed in the 
years following the Kosovo War. To varying degrees, these 
justificatory techniques, which I catalogue in a typology I call 
“The Legitimacies of Humanitarian War,” entailed revisiting the 
existing doctrinal and institutional components of jus ad bellum 
to bring them in line with humanitarian interests and values. 
The purpose of this typology is not to recreate the tired debate 
over the legality or legitimacy of the Kosovo War. Rather, the 
objective is to illustrate to the reader that in the aftermath of 
Kosovo a range of justifications emerged that, if they had 
garnered sufficient international support, would have 
overturned the statist structure and values of jus ad bellum. The 
most prominent justification of humanitarian war to emerge 
during this period was a variant of RtoP that I call RtoP-
Humanity’s Version, which proposed substantial revisions to the 
rules and institutions of jus ad bellum. 
Ultimately, however, the international community rejected 
these legitimacies of humanitarian war. At the 2005 UN World 
Summit, a version of RtoP that I call RtoP-Realpolitik prevailed 
and jettisoned those features of RtoP-Humanity’s Version that 
challenged the existing jus ad bellum scheme. RtoP-Realpolitik was 
purposefully designed to make the legitimate use of force to 
protect civilians wholly dependent on the consent of the 
Security Council, which, as I argue below, is essentially a Great 
Power concert. In other words, while protecting civilian 
populations and safeguarding basic human rights have 
undoubtedly become recognized as legitimate causes for armed 
intervention by the international community, it remains that the 
pursuit of these humanitarian objectives is doctrinally and 
institutionally subordinate to the goal of protecting the essential 
interests of the Great Powers and the maintenance of inter-state 
peace. This means that the pursuit of humanitarian objectives 
and the protection of human lives continues to function within 
the bounds and limits of Great Power politics. 
In a sense, therefore, the international response to the 
Syrian civil war is unsurprising. By adopting RtoP-Realpolitik, the 
international community effectively drew a line in the sand not 
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at the perpetration of egregious crimes against civilians, whether 
committed using conventional or non-conventional weapons, 
but at the essential interests of the Great Powers. The 2005 
World Summit practically prioritized the protection of Russian 
and Chinese interests—and those of the other Great Powers—
over the humanitarian interest in protecting civilians from mass 
atrocities. This indicates that the social objectives underlying jus 
ad bellum continue to reflect the privileging of statist, not 
humanist, values, which challenges suggestions that world 
politics is witnessing the emergence of a global community of 
humankind. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the claim 
that international law is undergoing a process of 
constitutionalization that is laying the groundwork for the 
emergence of a global community of humankind. In this Part, I 
also outline the contours of what I call the ‘humanitarian thesis,’ 
which is the label I attach to claims that the international legal 
order is experiencing a shift from state-centrism to a focus on 
the rights, needs, and interests of individual human beings. Part 
I also explains how the putative humanization of international 
law challenges the norms and institutions of jus ad bellum, and 
concludes with a discussion of how the Kosovo War provided an 
opportunity to fundamentally revise the tenets of this field of 
international law. 
Part II is devoted to laying out my typology of justifications 
for waging humanitarian war that emerged in the aftermath of 
the Kosovo War, including a discussion of the content of RtoP-
Humanity’s Version. Finally, Part III demonstrates how the 
international community ultimately rejected all these 
justifications and adopted RtoP-Realpolitik, which preserved the 
doctrinal and institutional structure of jus ad bellum and the 
statist values underlying this legal regime. 
I. HUMANITARIANISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International legal scholarship is awash with talk about the 
transformational changes that the field is experiencing. 
International law, traditionally understood as the corpus of rules 
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regulating relations between territorially distinct sovereign 
states, is expanding exponentially.25 Symptoms of this growth are 
abundant. Formerly unregulated areas of international affairs 
have come within the ambit of international law,26 while 
numerous actors, such as individuals, corporations, civil (and 
uncivil) society, and international organizations, are becoming 
increasingly integral to the international legal process, and at 
times even challenging states as the principal actors in particular 
fields.27 
But international law is not only expanding horizontally to 
include more issue-areas and actors. It is also growing vertically. 
For decades, governments, courts, and scholars have 
acknowledged the emergence of a normative hierarchy in 
international law. Certain rules are considered to enjoy 
superiority over and trump other rules. In addition, the practice 
of international law is becoming progressively institutionalized. 
Countless global and regional organizations and courts of both 
general and issue-specific jurisdiction have been established to 
manage vast swaths of international affairs.28 
More profoundly, it is argued that this multidimensional 
expansion of international law reflects a deeper transformation: 
the purpose underlying the entire system has changed. As 
discussed below, proponents of what I call the ‘humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                     
25. See Anne Peters, The Growth of International Law between Globalization and the 
Great Power, 8 AUSTRIAN REV INT’L & EUR. L. 109 (2003) (arguing that international law 
is not only expanding, but exploding). 
26. For example, international law today regulates access to and exploitation of 
the global commons, which has also spurned the rapid evolution of international 
environmental law. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 2002). As space travel became relatively routine since the 
mid-twentieth century, a series of multilateral treaties were contracted to ensure that 
space exploration is undertaken for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the entire 
international community. See generally NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, INTERNATIONAL 
SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1999). Similarly, the scientific realization of the 
negative impacts of degradation of biodiversity led to concerted international efforts to 
protect the global ecosystem. See BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Simone Bilderbeek ed., 1992). 
27. See, e.g., Jose Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213 
(2002) (discussing the role of international organizations in the negotiation and 
conclusion of treaties). See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Reiner Hofmann ed., 1999). 
28. See generally KALEVI HOLSTI, TAMING THE SOVEREIGNS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2004) (examining the proliferation of international 
institutions and their role in altering the dynamics of inter-state interactions). 
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thesis’ maintain that an international legal order has emerged, 
the objective of which is no longer limited to facilitating 
interaction between juridically equal states, but that is 
committed to the deeper social purpose of protecting the rights 
and interests of human beings. This foundational 
transformation, scholars argue, is subjecting international law to 
the “pain of revolutionary change . . . . It is difficult to think of a 
structural aspect of international law which is not in a state of 
disorder, incoherence, and contention.”29 
Jus ad bellum, like many other fields of international law, is 
said to have felt the reverberations of this ‘revolution.’ Instead 
of its traditional focus on minimizing inter-state violence, 
maintaining state independence, and protecting the territorial 
integrity of states, proponents of the humanitarian thesis argue 
that jus ad bellum is evolving towards prioritizing the protection 
of human security and human rights. To be fully appreciated, 
however, these claims about the changing nature of jus ad bellum 
should be placed within and viewed as part of the broader 
debate about the ongoing transformation of the international 
legal order. That is the purpose of this Part of the Article. It 
begins by describing how the humanitarian thesis fits within 
wider claims about the constitutionalization of international law. 
This is followed by outlining the main contours of the 
humanitarian thesis and a discussion of how the rules governing 
the resort to force by states are affected by this putative rise of 
humanitarianism as the overall animating purpose of 
international law. 
A. From International Unsociety to Global Community 
In keeping with what is a scholarly tradition, this brief 
overview of the evolving character of international law begins 
with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The series of agreements 
that concluded the Thirty Years War,30 collectively known as the 
Peace of Westphalia, enjoy an almost mythical status in the 
                                                                                                                                     
29. Philip Allott, Reconstituting Humanity–New International Law, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
219, 246 (1992). 
30. The principal legal instruments that brought the Thirty Years War to an end 
were the Treaty of Münster and Treaty of Osnabrück which were concluded in October 
1648. See Peace of Westphalia, Oct. 10, 1648, 1 Parry 271; 1 Parry 119. 
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history of both international law and international relations.31 
These agreements are frequently cited as the foundation of 
modern international law,32 and as the moment at which state 
sovereignty became recognized as the ordering principle of 
international relations.33 
Since the Peace of Westphalia, diplomats and scholars alike 
imagined a world populated by territorially distinct, juridically 
equal, sovereign states. Two implications flow from this 
imagined reality.34 First, a distinction was erected between the 
internal domain and the external realm. In the former, a 
hierarchical order existed in which an all-omnipotent sovereign 
reigned supreme by monopolizing both law-making authority 
and the legitimate use of force. This meant that sovereigns were 
free to adopt whichever system of governance they wished and 
were protected against outside interference in the internal 
administration of their states. Externally, all sovereigns 
coinhabited a horizontal plain in which none enjoyed inherent 
supremacy over another.35 This meant that, in the absence of a 
supreme sovereign capable of maintaining peace between the 
sovereigns, an anarchic realm emerged,36 in which, to use 
                                                                                                                                     
31. For example, Hans Morgenthau considered the legal principles agreed upon 
in the Peace of Westphalia “the cornerstone of the modern state system.” HANS 
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, 294 (6th ed. 1985). 
32. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xv (5th 
ed. 2009); see also Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20 
(1948); Sebastian Schmidt, To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of 
Westphalia in International Relations Literature, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 601 (2011). 
33. For a short study on the Peace of Westphalia and the roots of the concept of 
sovereignty, see Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of 
Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST. R. 569 (1999). 
34. I call this world “imagined” because in reality world politics never 
corroborated the theoretical postulates of the Westphalian order. States have 
continuously either willingly accepted or grudgingly succumbed to various forms of 
intervention in their internal affairs. Nonetheless, I use this simplistic conception of the 
Westphalian order to illustrate its most salient features and to shed light on the role of 
international law in this system. For a more realistic depiction of the Westphalian 
order, see Stephen Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 
1995/1996, at 115. 
35. The clearest judicial expression of this image of the international order 
appears in the decision in the Island of Palmas dispute. The arbitrator, Swiss jurist Max 
Huber, observed: “Sovereignty in the relation between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the 
exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state.” Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. 
Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932). 
36. WALTZ, supra note 11, at 88–93. 
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Thomas Hobbes’ graphic illustration, sovereigns are perpetually 
locked “in the state and posture of gladiators, having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, 
their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their 
kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbors: which is a 
posture of war.”37 
The second implication of this Westphalian worldview 
relates to the nature and function of international law. Because 
this order lacked a centralized law-making authority capable of 
promulgating laws binding its subjects, international law was 
predicated on the consent of sovereign states.38 In other words, 
states could not be bound to legal obligations absent their 
voluntary consent.39 As to its function, in this insecure, 
uncertain, and suspicious world populated by inherently 
competitive states, it was unlikely that law would aspire to much 
more than the circumscribed role of maintaining 
communication and facilitating interaction between these 
sovereign states. This legal system, aptly dubbed the 
international law of coexistence,40 sought to merely “establish a 
minimum order between antagonistic entities that challenge any 
authority superior to themselves and which perceive their 
relations as a ‘zero sum game’ where one’s gain is immediately 
perceived as another’s loss.”41 
The dominant view today, however, is that the reality of 
global affairs mocks this Westphalian image.42 Most writings 
                                                                                                                                     
37. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89–90 (Richard Tucker ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1991) (1651). 
38. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Aurther 
Watts eds., 1992); see also JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51–52 (Sir Humphrey 
Waldock ed., 1963). 
39. The canonical statement reflecting the theory that states could only bear legal 
obligation to which they consented appears in the Lotus Case wherein the Permanent 
Court of International Justice remarked that “International law governs relations 
between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate 
from their own free will . . . . Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot 
therefore be presumed.” S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at I8 
(Sept. 7). 
40. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
60–61 (1964). 
41. Georges Abi-Saab, Whither the International Community? 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 248, 
251 (1998). 
42. This prompted many authors to announce the emergence of a post-
Westphalian era. See, e.g., RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? 
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collectively refer to the historical processes that contributed to 
this transformation of international relations under the broad 
and often ill-defined banner of globalization.43 The impact of 
the political, economic, social, and ideational changes that 
occurred, especially since World War II,44 are considered to have 
had the effect of revolutionary change on the structure of global 
affairs.45 Coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
processes of globalization are argued to have succeeded in 
dethroning “the realist world order dominated by sovereign 
states.”46 
International law is also said to have evolved from the 
minimalist law of coexistence prevalent under the classical 
Westphalian image of world politics into a law designed to 
promote the interests of a global community of humankind. 
One storyline that traces this transformation of international law 
is the claim that international law is undergoing a process of 
constitutionalization.47 The salient theme running throughout 
the constitutionalization literature and that captures its essence 
is the hierarchization of international law.48 The constitutionalist 
claim is predicated on the emergence of a tripartite normative, 
valuative, and institutional hierarchy within the international 
legal system, all of which indicate that a global community 
                                                                                                                                     
(Trudy Jacobsen et al., eds., 2008); BEYOND WESTPHALIA? NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995). 
43. DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION: 
BEYOND THE GREAT DIVIDE 2–3 (2d ed. 2009). 
44. For a concise and holistic overview of the changes and developments that 
brought about the phenomena that are frequently associated with globalization, see 
DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE 
414–52 (1999). 
45. DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY 2 (2001) (speaking of the 
“overthrow” of the basic rules undergirding international relations). 
46. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 303 (2002). 
47. For an introductory survey of the debate, see TOWARDS WORLD 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
(Ronald. St. John Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005). 
48. Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2009) (noting 
that “the various manifestations of verticalization tend to stem from constitutionalist 
sentiments”); see also Thomas Kleinlein, Between Myths and Norms: Constructivist 
Constitutionalism and the Potential of Constitutional Principles in International Law, 81 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 79, 97 (2012) (“Hierarchization of public international law is 
considered to be a crucial element of constitutionalism.”). 
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governed by law is replacing the anarchic universe of coequal 
sovereigns.49 
The normative hierarchization of international law has 
been the subject of much doctrinal debate.50 The centerpiece of 
this normative growth is the recognition that certain principles, 
referred to as either jus cogens or peremptory norms,51 constitute 
supreme rules from which no derogation is permissible.52 While 
no exhaustive list of peremptory norms has been compiled, the 
prohibitions on aggression, slavery, genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity are frequently cited as constituting jus 
cogens norms.53 The rationale underling recognizing these 
principles as enjoying an elevated status within the international 
legal system relates to the morally reprehensible nature of the 
proscribed activities.54 Thus, “the higher purposes and values 
represented by these superior norms, which are deemed non-
derogable, constitute basic elements of a ‘world constitution’.”55 
                                                                                                                                     
49. Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 51 
(2006) (arguing that the international constitutional order consists of “an international 
community, an international value system, and rudimentary structures for its 
enforcement”). 
50. For a brief introduction to the concept of normative hierarchy in 
international law, see Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 145 (Malcolm Evans ed., 3d ed. 2003). 
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
52. Thus, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) observed that “[w]here 
there is an apparent conflict between primary obligations, one of which arises for a 
State directly under a peremptory norm of general international law, it is evident that 
such an obligation must prevail.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001). 
53. Id. Government statements, court decisions, and scholarly views have 
identified a broad panoply of obligations and rights as possibly having attained the 
status of jus cogens norms. These include: the right to self-determination, the 
prohibitions on torture, forced labor, racial discrimination, and the principles equality 
before the law and non-refoulment. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY 
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50–66 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2006). 
54. For example, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht described obligations enjoying a higher 
legal status as “expressive of rules of international morality.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, 155, UN Doc. A/CN.4.63 (1953 Vol. II). 
Lord McNair also identified certain “rules of law and some principles of morality” that 
actors may not agree to violate. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 213–14 (1961). 
55. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, The Concept of International Community in 
International Law: Theory and Reality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM 
AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF GERHARD HAFNER 93–94 (James 
Crawford et al. eds., 2008). The body of higher international legal principles also 
566 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551 
Recognizing the normative hierarchization of international 
law is doubly significant for the purposes of this Article. First, 
proponents of the humanitarian thesis have underscored that 
many peremptory norms are rights of individuals,56 which 
demonstrates the priority human rights enjoy over other values 
and interests in international law.57 Second, the 
constitutionalization of international law and the recognition of 
certain principles as non-derogable overturn the Westphalian 
worldview of an international law predicated on state-consent. 
Indeed, a system where protecting “fundamental values is not to 
be left to the free disposition of states individually or inter se but 
is recognized and sanctioned by the law as a matter of concern 
to all States”58 challenges the image of an order populated by 
territorially disjoint, hermetic, and competing sovereigns. 
Instead, what emerges is a global community bound by shared 
values and interests that are embodied in legal instruments.59 
Proponents of the constitutionalization of international law 
argue that these values and interests constitute the ‘mortar’ that 
holds this putative global community together.60 In today’s 
                                                                                                                                     
includes obligations erga omnes, which are frequently presented as the opposite side of 
the jus cogens coin. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens, and 
Obligatio Egra Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 72 (1996). 
56. Karl Zemanek, The Unilateral Enforcement of International Obligations, 47 ZaöRV 
32, 39 (1987) (arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents jus 
cogens norms); see also Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988-1989). 
57. Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism Revisited, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 39, 49–
50 (2005); see also Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 491, 494–95 (2008). 
58. Bruno Simma, Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State 
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
SHABATI ROSENNE 823 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989). 
59. Thomas Kleinlein, Summary: Constitutionalization in International Law, 231 MAX-
PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FORDERUNG DER WISSENSCHAFTEN E.V. 703, 709 (2012). 
60. International constitutionalism is not the only school of thought that adopts 
an image of the international legal system predicated on and designed to achieve 
certain globally shared values. For example, the New Haven School, pioneered by Yale 
Law School Professor Myres MacDougal, has consistently viewed international law as a 
process that should be geared to the achievement of minimum world order and human 
dignity. See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew Willard, Policy Oriented Jurisprudence and 
Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 316 (1999); see also Hengameh Saberi, Love it or Hate it, But For the Right 
Reasons: Pragmatism and the New Haven School’s International Law of Human Dignity, 35 BC 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (2012). Liberal internationalists, such as Thomas Franck, 
Louis Henkin, and Anne-Marie Slaughter have also championed the cause of 
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world, the argument goes, the members of an all-inclusive global 
community61 have become cognizant of the fact that the 
provision of certain non-excludable ‘public goods’ requires their 
concerted cooperation.62 Examples of these include 
international peace and security, the prevention of aggression,63 
and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which is dubbed “the noblest branch of international law,”64 and 
proclaimed to be a foremost expression of globally valued 
ideals.65 Ultimately, this interdependence and the global 
commitment to these values and interests lead members of this 
community to view their “existence, security, and well-being, but 
also their identity as inexorably linked. Therefore, they share a 
feeling of responsibility and have a common interest to protect 
and promote the referent values. As a result, their modes of 
                                                                                                                                     
understanding the international legal system as advancing liberal ideas that give pride 
of place to basic human rights and democratic rule. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995); THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 240 (2000). 
61. By all-inclusive, I wish to indicate that the members of this community are not 
limited to states; quite to the contrary. Most authors emphasize that a global legal 
community extends well beyond the society of sovereign states to include a host of 
actors, both within and beyond the state including individuals, social and political 
groups, civil society actors, and supra-national organizations. See Robert McCroquodale, 
International Community and State Sovereignty: An Uneasy Symbiotic Relationship, in 
TOWARDS AN ‘INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY’? THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (Colin Warbrick & Stephen Tierney 
eds., 2006). 
62. Georges Abi-Saab, Cours General de Driot International Public, 207 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 1, 98–99 (1987-VII). 
63. Santiago Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How 
Community Interests Are Protected in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 398 (2010). 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which was the first international legal instrument to 
outlaw war, described the renunciation of war as ultimately necessary “to promote the 
welfare of mankind.” General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy, July 24, 1929, 46 Stat 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (Kellogg-Briand Pact). 
64. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 
RECUEIL DES COURS 217, 242 (1994-VI). 
65. For example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights underscores that 
protection of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the 
world.” Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Similarly, the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights highlighted that “human rights is a matter of priority for the international 
community.” World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (July 12, 1993). 
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socialization in the international field are value-loaded and 
purposeful.”66 Eventually, these values and interests seep into 
the legal system and find expression in international legal 
instruments, which in a curiously circular move, are then 
frequently paraded as evidence of the emergence of a value-
laden global community.67 The conclusion of innumerable 
international legal instruments to enable an interdependent 
global community to achieve these common values and 
objectives “illustrates that there is a worldwide social 
consciousness at work today . . . far beyond the traditional 
rituals of governmental interaction.”68 
As a testament to this emerging global consciousness, 
constitutionalists point to the third manifestation of the 
hierarchization of international law, which takes the form of the 
emergence of a variety of international organizations to manage 
global efforts to achieve this panoply of common values and 
interests. The debate over the relocation of sovereign powers 
and authorities from states to supra-national entities, whether 
regional or global, enjoys considerable scholarly attention and is 
too broad to be covered here.69 Two insights drawn from this 
debate, however, are relevant for the purposes of this Article. 
First, by transferring prerogatives traditionally associated with 
                                                                                                                                     
66. Nicholas Tsagourias, International Community, Recognition of States, and Political 
Cloning, in TOWARDS AN ‘INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY’? THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 211, 214–15. 
67. See Santiago Villalpando, supra note 63, at 399–411. For a skeptical view 
regarding the role of globally shared ‘values’ as the animating force behind many of 
the international legal instruments that are frequently cited as evincing the emergence 
of a global valuative community, see Jean d’Aspremont, The Foundations of the 
International Legal Order, 18 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (2009). 
68. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 
RECUEIL DES COURS 221, 234 (1994-VI); see also Dino Kritsiotis, The Power of International 
Law as Language, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 397 (1997). 
69. A collection of essays compiled by Neil Walker provides a useful introduction 
and overview of this debate. RELOCATING SOVEREIGNTY (Neil Walker ed., 2006). The 
terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalization’ have been used in different ways in 
relation to international organizations. One way that these terms have been employed 
is to refer to the study of the foundational treaties of international organizations and 
their internal governance. Some scholars call this “micro-constitutionalism.” Another 
way in which constitutionalism has been used in this context is to refer to the 
burgeoning role supranational institutions perform in global governance which 
challenges the traditional functions of nation-states. This form of constitutionalism is 
labeled “macro-constitutionalism.” See CHRISTINE SCHWOBEL, GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (2011). 
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the nation-state to supra-national entities, the institutional 
hierarchization of international law upends the image of an 
anarchical horizontal plain of autonomous coequal sovereigns.70 
The almost universally cited example of this form of institutional 
hierarchization is the European Union, which is proclaimed to 
have taken Europe into a post-national age.71 With its universal 
membership, general jurisdiction, and centrality in world affairs, 
the United Nations is also often presented as the legitimate 
representative and agent of the international community.72 
Second, in the constitutionalist narrative, supranational 
institutions are not mere servants of their state-masters. Rather, 
these institutions take on a life of their own and become 
responsible for enforcing communal values and interests, 
regardless of the narrower interests or occasionally myopic views 
of any particular state or actor.73 Ultimately, the progressive 
institutionalization of international affairs at both the regional 
and global levels is considered no less than “the fulfillment of 
the idea of community; it brings the community to perfection.”74 
The cumulative effect of this tripartite normative, valuative, 
and institutional hierarchization is that the world order is 
                                                                                                                                     
70. Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competence, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 44 (highlighting that the “empowerment of 
international organizations is not an ordinary delegation of powers. It means that 
institutions other than the state can make decisions and adopt policies beyond the 
control of each individual member state”). 
71. A seminal volume in this regard is J.H.H. WEILER & MARLNE WIND, EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION BEYOND THE STATE (2003). Other scholars have likened the 
new European political, legal, and institutional landscape to a new form of medievalism 
marked my multiple layers of governance and authority. See Jorg Friedrichs, The 
Meaning of New Medievalism, 7 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 475 (2001). 
72. OTTO SPIJKERS, THE UNITED NATIONS, THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL VALUES 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); see Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as 
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998). For 
another, more cautious view regarding the UN Charter as the constitution of the 
international community, see James Crawford, The Charter of the United Nations as a 
Constitution, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1, 10–16 (Hazel 
Fox ed., 1997). 
73. Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 209 (“Here the 
states have lost control to a significant degree, and the entities’ will does not simply 
express the sum of the member states’ positions. The traditional image of the states as 
masters of the treaties is inadequate to describe that complex reality.”). 
74. P.H. Kooijmans, quoted in Don Greig, International Community, Interdependence, 
and All That … Rhetorical Correctness?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 583 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002). 
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purportedly moving from an “international unsociety”75 to a 
global community. In many constitutionalist narratives, this 
community is not a community of states. Rather, it is a 
“composite legal community of mankind.”76  
B. The Humanitarian Telos of International Law 
Given the implications that the hierarchization of 
international law entails for the Westphalian state-system, it is no 
wonder that human rights lawyers have been leading advocates 
of the constitutionalization claim.77  International human rights 
law is considered the foundation of a global constitutionalist 
order, the overarching purpose of which is the promotion and 
protection of individual rights and freedoms.78 The language 
used to describe the impact of the rise of human rights is both 
ostentatious and overwhelmingly celebratory.79 Human rights, 
we are told, has “revolutionized the international system and 
international law,”80 leading to no less than a “constitutive 
change” in the international legal order,81 that has altered the 
“deep structure of law in general.”82 Indeed, what in this Article 
I am calling the humanitarian thesis is predicated on the claim 
that the nature and function of international law have been 
transformed. The international law of coexistence, principally 
                                                                                                                                     
75. Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31, 35 (1999). 
76. Rao, supra note 55, at 93. 
77. Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 261, 271 (2003). 
78. Martin Scheinin, Impact on the Law of Treaties, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Menno Kamminga & Martin 
Scheinin eds., 2009). The European Court of Human Rights is frequently cited as 
corroborating the argument that human rights law embodies constitutional values. For 
example, in one decision, the Court observed that it must “have regard to the special 
character of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order for 
the protection of individual human beings.” Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 
Others, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE5 (2001). 
79. I say “overwhelmingly” and not unanimously because there are voices that 
have chronicled what are presented as the downsides and negative unintended 
consequences of the unprecedented international interest in human rights. See, e.g., 
DAVID KENNEDY, DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE (2005). 
80. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L AND COMP. 
L. 31, 43-44 (1995–1996). 
81. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 873 (1990). 
82. Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a 
Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 223, 228 (2006). 
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committed to upholding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and political independence of states, is progressively 
metamorphosing into a global legal system dedicated to 
upholding human values.83 This transformation, it is argued, is 
“undeniable, irresistible, irreversible.”84 
Although some writings advocating the constitutionalist and 
humanitarian theses occasionally blur the line separating 
descriptive claims about the existing state of international law 
and normative prescriptions about their preferred vision of the 
future for the global legal system,85 the theme underlying these 
arguments is that the purpose, or telos, of contemporary 
international law has become fulfilling the “needs and 
aspirations of humankind.”86 This transformation is not 
confined to the global legal system. The humanitarian thesis 
suggests that the rise to preeminence of human rights law 
reflects a reconceptualization of the entire architecture of 
international relations. Because humanist considerations are 
arguably reconstituting international politics, a new set of actors, 
values, and institutions are touted as progressively occupying 
center stage in global affairs.87 
Beyond the legal and political realms, humanitarianism also 
purports to be part of a profound process of global social 
evolution. In a humanist legal order, the rights, freedoms, and 
interests of all individuals are protected solely by virtue of their 
humanity and regardless of their membership in any particular 
social group, including states. This legal order is thus founded 
on a cosmopolitan image of the world predicated on an 
“association that binds the human race.”88 Other identities, 
                                                                                                                                     
83. See Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 627, 640–41 (2011). 
84. Henkin, supra note 80, at 35. 
85. Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, From Bilateralism to Publicness in 
International Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 79 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (noting that the notion 
of an international community is employed both as a descriptive device and as an 
embodiment of a normative view). 
86. Antonio Augusto Trinidade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New 
Jus Gentium, 316 RECUEIL DES COURS 83 (2005). 
87. Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 335, 359 (2002).  
88. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 195 (2011). For an introductory discussion 
about the meaning and contours of cosmopolitanism as a philosophical position, see 
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allegiances, or loyalties appear to be ultimately subordinated to 
a universal cosmopolitan citizenship.89 
The full impact and import of these changes in the 
international legal order are not immediately apparent from the 
almost messianic language chronicling and lauding the rise of 
humanitarianism. The impact this shift on the foundations of 
international law from statism to humanitarianism is reported to 
have affected every branch and component of the global legal 
system.90 First, the humanitarianism thesis echoes the broader 
constitutionalist claim regarding the normative hierarchization 
of international law. The recognition that certain principles, 
most of which protect human rights, have attained the status of 
jus cogens norms is assumed to have sounded “the death knell of 
narrow bilateralism and sanctified egoism for the sake of 
universal protection of certain fundamental norms relating, in 
particular, to human rights.”91  
Second, in a frontal assault on a central tenet of 
international law, human rights principles are considered 
invulnerable to state consent, long assumed to be the basis of 
international legal obligation. This manifests itself in a variety of 
ways. For example, human rights recognized as jus cogens norms 
are argued to be binding on states regardless of their consent.92 
Moreover, we are told that once states become parties to human 
rights treaties they are unable to either withdraw from or 
                                                                                                                                     
Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 312, 313 (Robert Goodin et al. eds., 2008) (noting that cosmopolitanism is 
predicated on “assessments and prescriptions . . . based on taking equal account of the 
interests of all human beings”). 
89. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 167. 
90. Menno Kamminga, Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law 
on General International Law, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 78, at 4 (indicating that “the impact of international 
human rights law on general international law is highly desirable in order to soften the 
international legal order’s predominantly state-centered nature”). Similarly, Michael 
Reisman considers these ongoing changes in international law to have caused a 
“qualitative change in virtually every component” of the legal system. Reisman, supra 
note 81, at 872. 
91. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 413, 432 (1983). 
92. Evan Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 331, 336 (2009). 
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renounce these instruments,93 which departs from the 
assumption underlying the entire corpus of the law of treaties 
that states are bound to agreements only by virtue of their 
consent.94 Furthermore, the rules governing state reservations 
against the provisions of treaties are deemed to be inoperable in 
relation to human rights instruments.95 Recent scholarly opinion 
and state practice also suggests that human rights treaties are 
unaffected by state secession.96 This multifaceted demotion of 
state consent, a premier feature of the anarchical order of 
coequal sovereigns, is considered an indelible confirmation of 
the shift towards “a shared humanity-based normativity.”97 
Having deposed state consent, the humanitarian thesis then 
moves to overthrow international law’s most hallowed principle: 
                                                                                                                                     
93. The Human Rights Committee, established to monitor state compliance with 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), opined that: 
[T]he Covenant is not the type of treaty which, by its nature, implies a right 
of denunciation . . . the Covenant codifies in treaty form the universal human 
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . [a]s such, 
the Covenant does not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a 
right of denunciation is deemed to be admitted. 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 26: Continuity 
of Obligations, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Aug 12, 1997). 
94. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2d ed. 2007) (“To 
consent to be bound is therefore the most significant, positive act which a state can take 
in relation to any treaty.”). 
95. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) outlines the rules 
allowing states to enter reservations to multilateral treaties, presumably including 
human rights treaties. See Vienna Convention, supra note 51, arts. 19–23. The Human 
Right Committee, however, declared that these rules were inapplicable to the ICCPR. 
In 1994, the Committee concluded that the provisions of the VCLT: 
[O]n the role of State objections in relation to reservations are inappropriate 
to address the problem of reservations to human rights treaties. Such treaties, 
and the Covenant specifically, are not a web of inter-State exchanges of 
mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals with rights. 
The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place . . . . It necessarily falls to 
the Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with 
the object and purpose of the Covenant. 
Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues 
Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. DOC. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (11 Apr. 1994). 
96. Malcolm Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 5 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 34, 84 (1994); 
Florintino Ruiz Ruiz, The Succession of States in Universal Treaties on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 42, 42–43 (2003). 
97. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 172. 
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state sovereignty. Contemporary attacks on sovereignty98 as an 
ordering principle of international relations came from many 
quarters. It appeared, especially in the post-Cold War years, as if 
forces from within and without the state conspired to 
deconstruct sovereignty.99 Separatist movements, sub-national 
groups, ethnic minorities, and tribes in various countries 
challenged the supremacy of national governments leading in 
many cases to the disintegration of formerly sovereign states. 
Meanwhile, proponents of trade liberalization viewed 
sovereignty with its, at least theoretically, impregnable borders 
as antithetical to the ideal of open global markets. Similarly, 
climate change, avian flu, terrorism, financial crises, and 
innumerable other phenomena all ridiculed the image of a 
world of territorially disjointed, mutually exclusive states. In 
short, “sovereignty is no longer sovereign; the world has 
outgrown it.”100 
Advocates of the humanitarian thesis have been particularly 
aggressive in their criticism of sovereignty. So much so that the 
concept is treated as an epithet to be referred to as “the ‘S’ 
word” and is described as “a mistake, an illegitimate 
offspring.”101 Disdain of sovereignty by proponents of 
humanitarianism is understandable. The principal implication 
of sovereignty, as understood in classical international law, is 
that states are immune to outside intervention in their internal 
                                                                                                                                     
98. Many scholars of international law exhibited varying degrees of discomfort 
regarding sovereignty long before the emergence of human rights as a subfield of 
international law. See Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as 
New Natural Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 395, 403 (2009) (“From the late 19th century 
onwards, international lawyers have been critics of sovereignty as egoism, arbitrariness, 
and absolute power.”). 
99. Even the way the word ‘state’ is written attests to its receding role. Previously, 
as a sign of reverence to the sole subject of international law, scholars routinely 
capitalized the ‘S’ in State, as if writing of a deity! Today, words like state, government, 
and contracting parties, are written in small caps. Notable exceptions to this trend are 
judgments of the International Court of Justice. 
100. Thomas Weiss & Jarat Chopra, Sovereignty Under Siege: From Intervention to 
Humanitarian Space, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION, supra note 42, at 87, 97. 
101. Louis Henkin, The ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights Et 
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1999). 
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affairs,102 including how governments treated their own citizens. 
The emergence and exponential growth of human rights law 
since World War II, however, pierced the veil of sovereignty.103 
International law was now regulating the relationship between 
governments and individuals within their jurisdiction. This 
expansion of the domestic reach of international law prompted 
observers to announce that the statist version of sovereignty, 
with its emphasis on non-intervention, had finally been 
displaced. 
Instead, a humanitarian conception of sovereignty was 
emerging,104 whereby the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms became the justification and rationale of 
sovereignty.105 This reimagined sovereignty is ultimately defined 
as “the legal principle that human rights, interests, needs, and 
security must be respected and promoted, and that this 
humanistic principle is also the telos of the international legal 
system.”106  
Having disarmed sovereignty, humanitarianism then 
challenges another foundational assumption of international 
law that all states are juridically equal. In a humanitarian world 
order, “the autonomy of states is not intrinsically a human 
value.”107 Autonomy and the continued exercise of the privileges 
of sovereignty are conditional on a state’s promotion and 
                                                                                                                                     
102. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 254 (1st ed. 1966) 
(describing the principle of the non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as “a 
master principle” of international law). 
103. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 337 (1997) (depicting the criminalization 
of crimes against humanity and the prosecutions of former Nazi officials at Nuremburg 
as “piercing the veil of sovereignty”). 
104. In its widely cited inaugural decision in the Tadic case, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) observed: “A State-sovereignty-
oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented 
approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est 
(all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in the 
international community as well.” Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
105. Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict, in TOWARDS AN ‘INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL COMMUNITY’? THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 131, 160–61; see also Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of 
Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (London), Sept. 18, 1999, at 49. 
106. Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and  of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 
514 (2009). 
107. Henkin, supra note 101, at 12. 
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protection of human rights. Some scholars go a step further and 
suggest that international law, especially in the post-Cold War 
era, recognizes liberal democracy as the premier system of 
government.108 Therefore, humanitarians argue that states that 
are either unwilling or incapable of protecting human rights, or, 
in some views, those which fail to progress towards liberal 
democracy, could become prone to foreign intervention to 
protect individual rights and promote democracy.109 In short, 
international law simply would neither recognize nor protect 
abusive or illiberal states. 
The ambition of both the humanitarian thesis and the 
broader constitutionalist project is far more profound than 
merely challenging tenets of international law such as 
sovereignty, consent, and the equality of states. These 
intellectual endeavors are engaged in a bid to restructure 
international relations and transform global politics. So potent 
is this putative multifaceted hierarchization of international law 
and the humanitarian values underlying it that it is capable of 
reconstituting the international community.110 This, it is argued, 
warrants reversing Cicero’s idiom ubi soceitas; ibi jus into ibi ius 
gentium; ubi soceitas.111 
In other words, the humanitarian international legal order 
is argued to be capable of vanquishing the world of sovereign 
states and giving birth to a universal community of humankind. 
As part of this process, the emergent humanist legal order 
remodels how foreign policy is crafted and reorients the 
                                                                                                                                     
108. Niels Petersen, The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law, 34 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 33 (2008). On this basis, some scholars have proposed 
differentiating between liberal and illiberal states, with international law granting the 
former the right to intervene in the affairs of the latter to promote democracy and 
human rights. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal 
States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 516 (1995). The idea of differentiating between states on 
the basis of the nature of their domestic system was also famously adopted by the 
leading political philosopher John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
(1999). 
109. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 214; see also Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 91 (1992); FERNANDO TESON, A 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–66 (1998). 
110. TESON, supra note 109, at 39. 
111. James Crawford, Responsibility for Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An 
Appraisal of Article 48 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUDGE 
BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 224, 240. 
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purposes it serves.112 State interests, national security, global 
strategy, and the pursuit of power, long considered language 
and logic of international relations, are being replaced by “a 
depoliticized legalist language of rights and wrongs, duties and 
obligations.”113 In the place of the egoism of raison d’état, the 
humanitarian thesis imagines an international community 
committed to the pursuit of collectively shared humanistic 
values.114 This dual rise of humanitarianism and expunging of 
politics from global affairs ultimately emancipates humanity 
from the anarchical Hobbesian state of nature and establishes a 
hierarchical cosmopolitan order.115  
C. Humanitarianism and the Transformation of Jus ad Bellum: From 
State Security to Human Security 
One area where the impact of the newly emergent 
humanist telos of international law is said to have been 
particularly patent is jus ad bellum. The rules governing the 
resort to force by states in international relations are argued to 
have changed dramatically to permit armed intervention to 
protect civilians against gross human rights abuses. This, many 
advocates of the humanitarian thesis contend, demonstrates the 
depth of the ongoing humanization of the international legal 
system. Because waging war has long been considered the ultima 
ratio regum of states in the pursuit of their interests,116 the 
adoption of the protection of human beings as an overarching 
                                                                                                                                     
112. Teitel, supra note 87, at 356. 
113. Id. at 372 (emphasis added); see also Paul Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: 
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 
(2000) (“International law does not see this world of politics based on power, threat, 
and sacrifice. Indeed, its contemporary ambition is to overcome this world, to achieve a 
fundamentally depoliticized global order.”). 
114. See Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
2091, 2106 (2003) (suggesting that “in the place of the tired notions of state 
sovereignty, the new world order must embrace once again the idea of a ius humanitatis, 
a conception of law and justice that is able to “transcend jurisdictions and 
cultures . . .’”). 
115. See von Bogdandy, supra note 82, at 240. 
116. The phrase ultima ratio regum means: “the final argument of Kings,” and has 
been used to indicate that the resort to war is the ultimate weapons in the toolbox of 
sovereigns in their interactions in an anarchical world order. See e.g., Hans 
Morgenthau, The Machiavellian Utopia, 55 ETHICS 145, 146 (1945). 
578 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551 
purpose of war would provide irrefutable evidence that human 
ideals are indeed displacing statist values in world affairs. 
Before examining the humanitarianism claim about the 
transformation of jus ad bellum, it is necessary to illustrate the 
state-centric nature of jus ad bellum that the humanization of 
international law is said to have transformed. Because this 
Article is obviously not intended as a treatise on jus ad bellum, 
discussion will be limited to those features of this system that are 
relevant to the question of the use of force to protect 
individuals.117 
The current legal regime governing the resort to force by 
states is principally embodied in the UN Charter.118 Having 
emerged from the horrors of World War II, the victorious allies 
set out to reconstruct the global security architecture. The 
centerpiece of this reconstituted world order was to be the UN 
Charter, which was drafted against the background of the still-
recent memory of the demise of the League of Nations that was 
established to ensure that World War I was to be ‘the war to end 
all wars.’ “The preoccupation of the United Nations founders 
was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new 
system of collective security they meant it in the traditional 
military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge 
that aggression against one is aggression against all . . . .”119 It is, 
                                                                                                                                     
117. Countless volumes have been authored on jus ad bellum. Despite being 
published over forty years ago, I believe that the locus classicus in this area remains, IAN 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963), especially in 
that it provides a rich historical background to the UN Charter scheme on the use of 
force. For recent surveys of the field, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-
DEFENCE (5th ed. 2011); OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR (Emmanuelle 
Jouannet ed., Christopher Sutcliffe trans., 2010); MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2009); CHRISTINE 
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (Malcolm D. Evans & Phoebe N. 
Okowa eds., 3d ed. 2008); and, slightly older, ANTHONY AREND & ROBERT BECK, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, (1993). 
118. I say “principally” because a number of documents drafted prior to 1945 
constitute the foundation on which the UN Charter is predicated. The most significant 
of these is the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy, otherwise known as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was the first 
international legal instrument to unequivocally outlaw the resort to war. See Quincy 
Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 370 (1953). 
119. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report 
of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Synopsis, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter UNSG High-Level Panel Report]. I should note, however, 
that many international relations scholars understand the term “collective security” to 
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therefore, unsurprising that the overarching purpose of the 
United Nations was originally conceived of as the maintenance 
of international peace and security,120 where peace was 
understood as “a condition of absence of force in the relations 
among states.”121 
The primacy of inter-state peace among the purposes of the 
United Nations finds its ultimate expression in article 2(4) of 
the Charter, which prohibits the resort to force by states.122 This 
principle is considered a jus cogens norm,123 and has been 
described as a “fundamental or cardinal principal” of 
international law,124 and as the “cornerstone of peace.”125 The 
Charter lists three exceptions to this principle. First, all states 
may resort to armed force in self-defense.126 Second, UN 
members were permitted to use force against any of the World 
War II Axis powers.127 Third, the Security Council may resort to 
force to confront threats to, or breaches of, the peace, or acts of 
aggression.128 
                                                                                                                                     
denote a system whereby an act of aggression will be confronted by an automatic and 
collective response. See e.g., Mearsheimer, supra note 13. Judged by that standard, the 
UN Charter scheme, which I discuss in detail below, would not qualify as a collective 
security system especially in that it lacks any stipulation for an automatic response to 
acts of aggression. 
120. See Rudiger Wolfrum, Article 1, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 39, 42 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
121. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 19 (1964). 
122. Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.” See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
123. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 153 (June 27) (separate opinion of President Nagendra Singh); see 
also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reports 136, 254 (July 9) (separate opinion of 
Judge Nabil Elaraby). 
124. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 90 (June 27). 
125. C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 492 (1952). 
126. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
127. See U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1, and art. 107. These provisions are 
unanimously understood to be dead letter law, especially since all of the Axis powers 
have joined the UN, and some are even considered leading candidates to join the 
Security Council as Permanent Members. 
128. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 112, 125. 
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It appears, therefore, that the defining feature of the 
Charter-based jus ad bellum scheme is the prohibition of the 
unilateral use of force, except in self-defense, and the 
identification of the Security Council as the sole authority 
responsible for deploying armed force to protect international 
peace and security.129 This historically unprecedented power 
vested in the institution of the Security Council warrants a closer 
look at its composition and functions.130 
As is well known, the Security Council is composed of 
fifteen states. Ten of these are elected to two-year terms, while 
five states enjoy permanent membership.131 In addition, the 
“P5,” as the permanent members are dubbed in UN-speak, wield 
a veto that enables them to block any decision of the Council on 
substantive matters, the most important of which is the resort to 
armed force.132 The privileges bestowed onto the P5 reflect the 
pragmatism of the drafters of the UN Charter and their desire to 
avoid replicating the institutional deformities of the League of 
Nations. Principal among these was the absence of leading states 
that either never joined the League, most notably the United 
States, or that acquired membership late in its short life, such as 
the Soviet Union. In addition, decisions of the League Council, 
the precursor of the Security Council, could only be taken by 
unanimity. Both of these elements severely hindered the 
effectiveness of the League. Without Great Powers capable of 
enforcing its decisions and crippled by the need to secure 
                                                                                                                                     
129. Christine Gray, The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 86 (Vaughan Lowe et. al. eds., 2008). Kelsen 
confirms this by noting that the striking features of the UN Charter is that the resort to 
armed force “can be taken only by a central organ, the Security Council, and only after 
the Council has determined the existence of a threat to, or breach of, the peace.” 
KELSEN, supra note 121, at 725. 
130. EDWARD LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL 3 (Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden 
Wilkinson eds., 2006) (noting that the Security Council’s “enforcement authority is 
unique in the history of inter-governmental cooperation”). 
131. The P5 are: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The remaining seats are divided among the regional groupings within the 
United Nations in the following manner: Africa and Asia: five seats, Western Europe 
and Other States: two seats, Latin America and the Caribbean: two seats, and Eastern 
Europe: one seat. See David Malone, Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on 
the UN Security Council, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4-5 (2000). 
132. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
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unanimity among its members, the League quickly lost 
credibility, especially in the eyes of the revisionist Axis powers.133 
Therefore, for the founders of the United Nations, strong 
incentives had to be provided for the Great Powers to remain 
within the new world organization.134 These took the form of the 
permanent membership on the Security Council coupled with 
the guarantee, through the veto, that the United Nations would 
never jeopardize the security or interests of these states.135 
“Great Power status in the United Nations thus meant dominion 
over small powers . . . . The veto blocked UN action in any 
situation contrary to a Great Power’s interest, including conflicts 
with other Great Powers.”136 
In addition to the privileges enjoyed by the P5, the UN 
Charter grants the Security Council unmatched institutional 
powers. Article 24 of the Charter entrusts the Council with the 
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security,”137 which, given that the United Nations was 
principally intended to preserve inter-state peace, means that 
the Council occupies the very core of the UN system. To enable 
it to fulfill its responsibilities, the Charter endows the Council 
with a unique panoply of prerogatives. First, unlike any other 
UN organ, decisions adopted by the Council are obligatory on 
all member states.138 Second, and more importantly, pursuant to 
                                                                                                                                     
133. Leland Goodrich, From League of Nations to United Nations, 1 INT’L ORG. 3, 9–
10 (1947) (describing how the unanimity rule, among other factors, rendered the 
League incapable of taking action against either Japan following its invasion of 
Manchuria or Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia). 
134. Vaughan Lowe et. al, Introduction, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND WAR supra note 129, at 12 (“The Charter as a whole was drawn up with 
the central aim of ensuring that the major powers would be willing to join, and remain 
in, the organization.”). 
135. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN 8–32 (2006). 
136. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations 
Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 384 
(1994). 
137. The use of the word “primary” in article 24 of the Charter led the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to observe that: “The responsibility conferred is 
‘primary’, not exclusive. . . . It is only the Security Council which can require 
enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor. The Charter makes it abundantly 
clear, however, that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international 
peace and security.” Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Article 17, Paragraph 2, 
of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 163 (Jul. 20). 
138. U.N. Charter art. 25. 
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Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council may resort to 
enforcement measures, which is the codeword denoting a range 
of options including armed force, to maintain international 
peace and security. 
As a prerequisite to resorting to these measures the Council 
should “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”139 The Charter, 
however, does not define what constitutes a threat to or breach 
of the peace or an act of aggression, thereby granting the 
Council unlimited flexibility in identifying any particular crisis, 
situation, or incident as amounting to a threat or breach of the 
peace or act of aggression.140 Moreover, even if the Council were 
to identify a threat to or breach of the peace or act of 
aggression, it is under no obligation to take any action to 
confront such a situation.141 In a further show of its broad 
margin of appreciation, should the Security Council decide to 
take enforcement action, it is free to determine those measures 
that it considers adequate to respond to the particular situation 
before it. 
In other words, for the Security Council, the “freedom to 
decide when to apply coercive measures is matched by an equal 
discretion as to what measures may be taken . . . . Its discretion, 
thus, is virtually absolute in choosing the type of coercion which 
it considers best adapted to meet the situation at hand.”142 It 
should also be noted that, because the Charter prohibits the 
unilateral use of force, the mere identification by the Council of 
a threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression does not 
constitute a license for states to use force to confront these 
situations. Until the Council authorizes the deployment of force, 
                                                                                                                                     
139. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
140. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 108 
(1991) (describing the powers and authority of the Council in this regard as “virtually 
unlimited”). 
141. See KELSEN, supra note 121, at 734. (“[I]t is not possible to maintain that it 
[the Security Council] is under an obligation to take enforcement measures after it has 
determined the existence of a threat to, or breach of, the peace.”). 
142. Grayson Kirk, The Enforcement of Security, 55 YALE L.J. 1081, 1089 (1946). 
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“enforcement action by individual States on behalf of the 
United Nations is unlawful.”143 
A careful reading of the Charter also reveals that the 
prerogatives of the Security Council do not stop at the 
international boundaries of states. Article 39, not 
unintentionally, omits the word “international.” This indicates 
that threats to or breaches of the peace that could potentially 
unleash Council-authorized enforcement measures need not 
relate to inter-state tensions or conflicts.144 Human rights abuses, 
civil strife, non-international armed conflicts, violations of 
humanitarian law occurring during such conflicts, or any other 
domestic situation, even if not involving any acts of violence, 
were all considered since the inception of the United Nations as 
possibly warranting Security Council intervention, including 
through the use of force.145 Article 2(7) of the Charter confirms 
the power of the Council to authorize force in response to any 
occurrence inside a member state that in the Council’s view 
threatens or breaches the peace.146 “This provision enables the 
[Council] to tackle root causes of a conflict before it reaches 
dimensions which are harder or impossible to manage.”147 
The exceptional privileges of the P5 and the boundless 
powers of the Security Council were not uncontroversial at the 
San Francisco conference during which the UN Charter was 
finalized. A number of countries decried the inequity of the veto 
and warned that requiring P5 unanimity or at least their 
acquiescence meant that the Security Council could be 
incapacitated when it was most needed.148 These warnings 
                                                                                                                                     
143. Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch,  Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 701, 713–14. 
144. See KELSEN, supra note 121, at 731. 
145. See Frowein & Krisch, supra note 143, at 721; see also KELSEN, supra note 121, 
at 19 (“However, a civil war, as any other situation within a state, may be interpreted by 
the competent organ of the United Nations as a threat to international peace . . . .”). 
146. “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
147. Georg Nolte, Commentary on Article 2(7), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 148, 168–69. 
148. See LUCK, supra note 130, at 13–15. 
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proved prophetic given the innumerable situations during 
which the Council stood paralyzed in the midst of political and 
humanitarian crises, only the latest of which is the Syrian civil 
war. Therefore, some delegations suggested either eliminating 
the veto or limiting its use,149 while others proposed setting 
guidelines to direct the Council’s decisions.150 Calls were also 
made to define specific circumstances, especially aggression, in 
which it would be obligatory for the Council to forcefully 
intervene.151 The P5, covetous of their unrivaled influence and 
standing in the United Nations, were implacable. Ideas 
circumscribing their powers or limiting the Council’s flexibility 
were rejected. Ultimately, therefore, the United Nations, or at 
least its collective security scheme, had transformed “a wartime 
alliance into a big power oligarchy.”152 
The humanitarian thesis challenges this vintage-1945 
Charter scheme. Jus ad bellum, at least as conceived in the 
aftermath of World War II, is the quintessential expression of 
the international law of coexistence.153 Its purpose is minimizing 
violence in international relations by outlawing armed force 
between territorially disjointed and mutually exclusive sovereign 
states. The emergence, however, of a global community of 
humankind, driven by the hierarchization of international law 
and the rise to preeminence of human rights, arguably 
undermines the premise underlying jus ad bellum. 
Humanitarianism “reconceives security in terms of the 
protection and preservation of persons and peoples. Once the 
relevant subjects and goals in the international realm are 
reconceived in this way, the meaning and challenges of security 
in both war and peacetime become blurred.”154 In other words, 
                                                                                                                                     
149. See DAVID BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL 23–24 (2009). 
150. Edward Luck, A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and 
its Relevance Today, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 
129, at 61, 63, 67. 
151. Id. at 69. 
152. Id. at 63; see also Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, Precommitment Regimes 
for Intervention: Supplementing the Security Council, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 41, 47 (2011) 
(noting that “the UN Charter provides no checks on the Security Council: there are no 
constitutional constraints on what it can do. Indeed, when the Security Council acts, 
with the approval of all Great Powers and sufficient other support, its legal powers are 
essentially unlimited”). 
153. ABI-SAAB, supra note 41, at 254. 
154. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 13. 
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humanitarianism dethrones the sovereign state as the 
beneficiary of the global security architecture, and identifies the 
protection of the interests, rights, and freedoms of human 
beings as the objective of security policy.155 
This shift from state security to human security calls into 
question many of the classical features of both war and security, 
and challenges key doctrinal and institutional components of 
post-World War II jus ad bellum. In 1945, just as it had been for 
centuries, security was imagined as intrinsically intertwined with 
geography. National borders were considered sacrosanct 
dividers between a domestic domain and an external realm. 
Sources of insecurity, it was thought, primarily emanated from 
the latter. Thus, threats emerged if an adversary amassed troops 
along a shared border, when a neighbor accumulated weapons 
at an alarming rate, or if enemies threatened strategically 
valuable territory.156 Bringing human beings front and center, 
however, fundamentally revises the scope and content of 
‘security.’ An assortment of issues, all of which affect the quality 
                                                                                                                                     
155. Hisashi Owada, Human Security and International Law, in FROM BILATERALISM 
TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 
505, 506 (“Human security is often distinguished from traditional security doctrines on 
the basis that it makes individuals the central concern of security policy.”). Human 
security was not developed as a foil against state security solely in the area of jus ad 
bellum. Proponents of human security imagine the concept as a paradigm shift affecting 
how a broad variety of issues should be dealt with. The 1994 United Nations 
Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Development Report, considered a 
groundbreaking document in the elaboration of the content of human security, 
explained that the concept underlying this idea is that security should be reframed 
“from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s 
security.” The report goes on to identify to following areas of security that should be 
reexamined in light of the rights and needs of individual human beings as opposed to 
the interests of states. These areas are: (1) Economic security, (2) Food security, (3) 
Health security, (4) Environmental Security, (5) Personal security, (6) Community 
security, and (7) Political Security. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, NEW DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY 22–47 (1994); see also 
Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, INT’L SECURITY, FALL 2001, at 
87; Astri Suhrke, Human Security and the Interests of States, 30 SECURITY DIALOGUE 265 
(1999). 
156. Edward Newman, Human Security and Constructivism, 2 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 
239, 240 (2001) (“International security has traditionally been defined as military 
defense of territory. . . . National security therefore is the imperative of defending 
territory against, and deterring, ‘“external’” military threats.”). See generally Helga 
Haftendorn, The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International 
Security, 35 INT’L STUD. Q. 3, 5–6 (1991) (describing the emergence and meaning of 
“national security”). 
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of life of individuals, become potential sources of insecurity and 
gain a newfound urgency and importance.157 Among the 
especially prominent components of human security are the 
protection and promotion of human rights and the 
advancement of democracy.158 For proponents of the 
humanitarian thesis, armed force may therefore legitimately be 
employed in the quest to realize these aspects of human 
security.159 
Adopting humanist objectives for war also alters the nature 
of what counts as victory. Under a statist model of security, 
victory meant vanquishing enemies on the battlefield, signing 
armistices, concluding peace treaties, acquiring strategic 
deterrents, or establishing and maintaining spheres of 
influence. Success of armed intervention undertaken for 
humanitarian purposes, on the other hand, necessitates 
instituting deep political and social transformations in the 
country or territory subject to armed intervention. The 
intervening powers are obliged to ensure that governance 
structures are established that would guarantee basic human 
rights and enable the flourishing of democracy.160 In short, 
pursuing human security through armed force requires, in many 
cases, engaging in the difficult process of nation-building. 
Doctrinally, the humanitarian thesis, as discussed above, 
effectively neutralizes a number of the cardinal principles of 
international law, many of which are embodied in the UN 
Charter. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, the 
preservation of the political independence and territorial 
integrity of states, the inviolability of national boundaries, the 
freedom of states to adopt systems of government of their 
choice, and, ultimately, sovereignty are largely deactivated. 
None of these principles may be invoked to fend off 
intervention, including armed intervention, to achieve human 
security.161 
                                                                                                                                     
157. See, e.g., Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, New Threats to Human Security in the Era of 
Globalization, 4 J. HUM. DEV. 167 (2003). 
158. Gary King & Christopher Murray, Rethinking Human Security, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 
585, 591 (2002). 
159. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 201, 203. 
160. See Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391, 400 (2013). 
161. See Alex Bellamy & Matt McDonald, The Utility of Human Security: Which 
Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 373, 375–76 
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Despite the profundity of these implications that the rise of 
human security entails for international law and international 
relations, the harshest attacks of the humanitarian thesis are 
reserved for the institutional components of the UN Charter jus 
ad bellum scheme. As discussed above, nothing in the UN 
Charter proscribes the use of armed force to pursue human 
security-related objectives. UN practice during and, more 
frequently, after the Cold War bears out this assertion. On a 
number of occasions, developments within the domestic affairs 
of states, some of which involved human rights abuses, were 
brought before the Security Council, which labeled them as 
threats to the peace and at times took enforcement measures in 
response to these situations.162 Undoubtedly, the politically 
permissive climate of the post-Cold War years and the increase 
in internal conflicts contributed to the Council’s willingness and 
ability to authorize armed intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. These interventions, whether they took the form of 
UN peacekeeping operations or armed interventions sanctioned 
by the Council but led by regional organizations,163 do not, 
                                                                                                                                     
(2002) (“A discourse of human security that does not delegitimize states when they act 
as agents of human insecurity, does not devalue sovereignty when it protects the 
perpetrators of human wrongs . . . has, at best, very limited utility.”). 
162. For example, in 1960 the Security Council authorized the deployment of a 
large peacekeeping operation that, although first aimed at assisting the withdrawal of 
Belgian troops from the Congo, quickly evolved into an operation seeking to protect 
civilians, maintain law and order in a country threatened by civil war, and prevent the 
secession of its largest and wealthiest provinces. See Stanley Hoffman, In Search of a 
Thread: The UN in the Congo Labyrinth, 16 INT’L ORG. 331, 343–50 (1962). Another 
example of the Security Council’s intervention in an internal conflict, albeit without 
authorizing the use of force, is its passage of a series of resolutions relating to the 
situation in the mandated territory of Palestine prior to the declaration of 
independence by the State of Israel. On April 1, 1948, the Council passed Resolution 
43 in which it called on the Jewish and Arab communities to mandate Palestine to 
declare a truce and warned of the heavy responsibility that would befall the party that 
would violate that truce. See S.C. Res. 43, para. 3, UN Doc. S/RES/42 (Apr. 1, 1948). 
The Security Council’s condemnation of the South African apartheid regime and its 
imposition of sanctions provides another example of UN intervention in the internal 
affairs of states that, at least partially, sought to uphold basic human rights. See David 
Johnson, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 887, 902–03 (1978). For an 
overview of UN interventions in domestic situations that were considered a threat to 
the peace, see Paul Szasz, Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 345 (1983). 
163. The leading examples of post-Cold War interventions in internal conflicts, 
whether UN-led or UN-sanctioned, include the operations in the former Yugoslavia, 
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however, represent a fundamental revision of either the 
structure or substance of the UN Charter scheme. What these 
post-Cold War interventions indicate is that in light of the 
increasing incidence of internal armed conflicts and the human 
toll exacted by these crises, the Council palpably expanded its 
definition of the circumstances constituting threats to and 
breaches of the peace, and exhibited greater preparedness to 
authorize the use of force in response.164 
Nonetheless, it remains that whether at the height of Cold 
War tensions or in today’s less bellicose international 
environment, the sine qua non for undertaking any such 
intervention is securing Security Council approval, which in 
effect means ensuring the consent, or at least the acquiescence, 
of the P5.165 It is this institutional aspect of the Charter scheme 
that elicits the sharpest criticism from proponents of the 
humanitarian thesis. Especially after the tragic failure of a 
number of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s,166 and 
repeatedly thereafter when, as in the Syrian situation, the 
United Nations failed to authorize forceful measures to protect 
civilians, proponents of humanitarianism became increasingly 
“[c]onvinced that the UN Security Council cannot be relied 
upon to address these problems, and that the United 
Nations . . . is somehow to blame, they argue for a right of 
‘unilateral humanitarian intervention’, that is, a right to 
                                                                                                                                     
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. See generally ENFORCING 
RESTRAINT (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993). 
164. See Ruth Gordon, UN Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and 
Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 519, 545 (1994); see also Jennifer M. Welsh, The Security 
Council and Humanitarian Intervention, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND 
WAR supra note 129 at 537–38  (speaking of the increased willingness of the Council to 
intervene in civil conflicts which reflects an “expanded definition of threats to 
international peace and security”). 
165. See Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to 
Legitimize the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527, 531–32 (2005). 
166. The story of the UN’s peacekeeping failures has been told elsewhere and is 
not of direct relevance for the purposes of this paper. For a general overview, see LISE 
MORJÉ HOWARD, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CIVIL WARS 1–52 (2008); PAUL DIEHL, PEACE 
OPERATIONS 118–46 (2008); ALEX BELLAMY, PAUL WILLIAMS & STUART GRIFFIN, 
UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 75–93 (2004); U.N.S.C., Rep. of the Panel on 
Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000). 
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intervene for humanitarian purposes without the authorization 
of the Security Council.”167 
Skepticism regarding the necessity of Security Council 
approval for armed intervention climaxed in the aftermath of 
the 1999 Kosovo War. Unable to obtain the requisite Security 
Council authorization due to a prospective double Russo-
Chinese veto, NATO commenced a 78-day bombing campaign 
to protect the ethnic Albanian community of Kosovo against 
mass atrocities being perpetrated by Serbian forces.168 
Commenting on NATO’s resort to armed force, former 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) Judge Bruno Simma 
noted that the situation in Kosovo presented a “hard case in 
which terrible dilemmas must be faced and imperative political 
and moral considerations may appear to leave no choice but to 
act outside the law.”169 This divergence between, on the one 
hand, humanitarian imperatives and, on the other, the legalist 
Charter scheme, led to the oft-cited conclusion that the Kosovo 
War was “illegal but legitimate.”170 The war was judged to be 
illegal due to the absence of a Security Council imprimatur, but 
was considered legitimate because it served the moral objective 
of protecting civilians from mass atrocities. 
This finding represented a victory for the humanitarian 
thesis. The war, it was believed, had driven a wedge between an 
anachronistic legality and an emergent humanitarian legitimacy. 
It demonstrated that human values had infiltrated the statist 
realm of jus ad bellum and overturned its main tenets. In the 
months and years following the war, it was widely assumed that 
                                                                                                                                     
167. MICHAEL BYRES, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ARMED CONFLICT 92 (2007). For example, a former Canadian Foreign Minister and 
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WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO (2000). 
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INT’L L. 1, 22 (1999). 
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the doctrinal and institutional components of international 
legality had become inadequate,171 leading to governmental, 
inter-governmental, and scholarly proposals to revisit the 
existing jus ad bellum scheme. 
In addition to its legal consequences, the Kosovo War also 
had profound political implications. First, the war set a 
precedent that is regularly invoked in situations where the UN 
fails to take forceful action to prevent the perpetration of mass 
atrocities, such as during debates over whether the United States 
should intervene militarily in Syria.172 Second, the war was 
considered a milestone in the ongoing transformation of the 
values of the international system. In the old anarchical world of 
sovereign states, war was waged to pursue the national interest 
and protect state security. Its objectives were deterring 
aggression, maintaining balances of power, and expanding 
spheres of influence. In the emergent global community of 
humankind, however, war, as Kosovo demonstrated, is an 
instrument of humanity, and its purposes became the 
vindication of “moral ideals, self-determination, democracy, and 
human rights.”173 
II. THE LEGITIMACIES OF HUMANITARIAN WAR 174 
For a few years after the Kosovo War, the question of 
humanitarian war was the cause célèbre of the global diplomatic 
community to the extent that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
                                                                                                                                     
171. Peter Hilpod, From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect: Making 
a Utopia True?, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 462, 466. 
172. See Jack Goldsmith, What Happened to the Rule of Law?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/what-happened-to-the-rule-of-
law.html. 
173. See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the Turn 
to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 161 (2002). 
174. I prefer the term “humanitarian war” over “humanitarian intervention” for 
two reasons. The first is for the sake of semantic clarity. ‘Intervention’ denotes a broad 
set of policy tools, only one of which is the resort to force. Other measures include 
diplomatic censure, political pressure, economic sanctions, and arms embargoes all of 
which are frequently used to respond to humanitarian crises. Second, armed force is a 
special category of intervention. Because it is highly invasive, entails considerable 
human cost, and potentially violates the prohibition on the use of force in international 
relations, justifying war requires satisfying a higher and more complex standard of 
scrutiny than others forms of ‘intervention.’ 
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dedicated his address during the opening of the 54th Session of 
the UN General Assembly to assessing the future of human 
security and intervention.175  Juxtaposing the inaction during the 
Rwandan genocide against the intervention in Kosovo, Annan 
challenged world leaders to devise mechanisms that would 
ensure effective international responses to humanitarian crises 
without demolishing the post-World War II collective security 
architecture. The international community instantly took up 
Annan’s challenge.176 Countless governments, civil society 
organizations, and scholars working in fields including law, 
philosophy, ethics, political science, and military affairs 
generated a voluminous literature on both Kosovo and the 
broader question of humanitarian war.177 
The purpose of this Part is not to relive the debate over the 
legality of the Kosovo War or any particular conflict, such as the 
Libyan or Syrian civil wars, that posed difficult questions 
regarding the legality, legitimacy, or policy implications of 
forcefully intervening to protect civilians. Rather, the objective is 
to construct a typology of the justifications of the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes, especially those that emerged in the 
aftermath of Kosovo. I call this typology the legitimacies of 
humanitarian war. 
The purpose of this typology is to demonstrate that shortly 
after the Kosovo War the international community was 
presented with a broad range of justifications for waging 
humanitarian war that, to varying degrees, would have entailed 
overturning the post-World War II jus ad bellum scheme. As I 
argue below, however, these legitimacies of humanitarian war 
were rejected. Instead, a conscious choice was made in favor of 
the rules, institutions, and state-centric values of the jus ad bellum 
scheme embodied in the UN Charter. This challenges claims 
advanced by proponents of the humanitarian thesis about the 
changing nature of international law and casts a shadow of 
                                                                                                                                     
175. See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4, (Sept. 
10, 1999). 
176. I say “instantly” because the speaker immediately following Annan was the 
Algerian President who, speaking on behalf of Africa, warned against any diminution of 
sovereignty which was described as the “final defense against the rules of an unjust 
world.” Id. at 14. 
177. For an overview of this literature, see Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of 
Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2000). 
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doubt over contentions that global politics is evolving into a law-
governed community of humankind. 
Before proceeding, however, a few remarks should be 
borne in mind. First, as Simon Chesterman demonstrated in a 
highly illuminating volume, the debate on the resort to force to 
protect individuals against atrocities perpetrated by their own 
governments is far from novel.178 For centuries, governments, 
lawyers, theologians, and philosophers examined the 
justifiability of waging war to protect civilians. Many of the 
arguments that appeared in the aftermath of Kosovo advocating 
the right to wage humanitarian war echoed intellectual moves 
made in earlier contexts. 
Second, Kosovo was not the only crisis in recent history to 
spark criticism of the UN Charter-based jus ad bellum scheme. 
The 9/11 attacks, the war on terrorism, the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (“WMD”), and the doctrine of 
preemption all spawned governmental and scholarly challenges 
to the logic and relevance of the rules and institutions of jus ad 
bellum.179 Third, as discussed below, a common thread running 
throughout the legitimacies of humanitarian war is the desire to 
either reinterpret or revisit jus ad bellum to bring it in line with 
the emergent humanist legitimacy. In other words, for 
proponents of the humanitarian thesis, the gap that the Kosovo 
War had revealed between legality and legitimacy was to be 
bridged by making the former comport with the latter. 
Fourth, the project of reforming legality to reflect 
humanitarian values was principally adopted by western 
governments and scholars. Many countries and scholars, 
especially from the global south, harbored reservations 
regarding attempts to dismantle or modify the post-World 
War II jus ad bellum scheme. Most of these skeptical voices were 
not opposed to the use of force to protect civilians per se. 
Rather, their principal objection was to the unilateral resort to 
force without Security Council authorization.180 
                                                                                                                                     
178. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? 1–44 (2001). 
179. See generally BEYOND PREEMPTION: FORCE AND LEGITIMACY IN A CHANGING 
WORLD (Ivo Daalder ed., 2007). 
180. Nolte, supra note 147, at 164. For example, during the North American 
Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) intervention in Kosovo, Egypt’s Foreign Minister 
Amre Moussa condemned the atrocities perpetrated against the Albanian community 
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Fifth, the structure of legitimation, especially when 
justifying the resort to war, is complex.181 Arguments supporting 
the use of force frequently draw on multiple forms of 
legitimation. Therefore, readers should keep in mind that, in 
reality, the resort to force is rarely justified on the basis of one 
single form of legitimation from among those in my typology.182 
Sixth, when dealing with global politics, a slight dose of 
cynicism is healthy. Justifications for the resort to war, especially 
war waged for humanitarian purposes, are routinely cloaked in 
the language of international law and universal morality.183 
These justifications could reflect genuine humanitarian 
concerns or may be deployed to conceal the pursuit of national 
self-interests. More realistically, however, forceful intervention to 
protect the citizens of foreign countries is driven by a diverse set 
of motivations, which include a mix of ideational and material 
                                                                                                                                     
of Kosovo, but noted that “dealing with this issue falls within the jurisdiction of the UN 
and the Security Council.” The Indian Foreign Ministry also expressed concern 
regarding the use of force by NATO, which it warned would “seriously undermine the 
authority of the entire UN system.” These and other statements made in response to 
the Kosovo War are available in HEIKE KRIEGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 1974–1999 424–99 (2001). The 
Non-Aligned Movement, which is the largest bloc at the United Nations, also repeatedly 
declared its opposition to “all unilateral military actions, or use of force or threat of use 
of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence,” of states and 
expressed “strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally 
imposed measures that undermine the UN Charter and international law.” See Final 
Document of the XV Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-
Aligned Movement, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt July 15–16 2009. NAM2009/FD/Doc.1, at 
paras. 19.4, 24.5. 
181. Although writing in the context of judicial reasoning, Robert Summers’ 
observations about the structure and components of justification are relevant here, 
since the use of force, like adjudication, is a form of the exercise of coercion. See 
Robert Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law 
Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 727–28 (1978). 
182. The justifications presented by NATO member states in the aftermath of the 
Kosovo War attest to this complex and multifaceted structure of justification. During 
oral pleadings held before the ICJ  in a case brought by Serbia against NATO member 
states, the agent for the United States noted that the war was justified on a number of 
grounds, which I categorize in different forms of legitimation. These grounds included 
the impending humanitarian catastrophe, the threat posed to neighboring countries by 
the conflict, the human rights perpetrated by Serbian forces, and previous UN Security 
Council resolutions. See Public Sitting in the Case Concerning the Legality of the Use of 
Force (Yugoslavia v. USA), 1999 I.C.J. 916, at 10 (May 11).  
183. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International 
Relations: A Rational Choice Approach, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115 (2002). 
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factors.184 Nonetheless, whatever the underlying motivations 
driving the decision to resort to humanitarian war, the process 
of legitimation and providing justification for waging war, even 
if functioning solely as a façade for ulterior political motives, is 
important for two reasons. 
First, legitimacy is a valuable commodity in international 
relations. All states, whether Great Powers or peripheral players, 
seek to justify their policies, especially the decision to resort to 
war, to a diverse audience of domestic constituencies, allies, 
adversaries, and a global civil society.185 This is because all 
coercion, whether in the form of armed force, or even in its less 
bellicose manifestation, judicial decisions, requires legitimation 
to distinguish it from mere banditry or arbitrary tyranny.186 This 
felt need to ensure that the exercise of power and influence 
enjoys legitimacy is a phenomenon that has long been 
recognized in domestic societies,187 and that has only recently 
gained greater attention in the study of international politics.188 
Domestically, societies seek to subject coercion to “justifiable 
rules, and the powerful themselves will seek to secure consent to 
their power from at least the most important among their 
subordinates.”189 Internationally, Great Powers, like dominant 
players in domestic politics, seek to transform their 
preponderant power into authority. This is because a legitimacy 
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justify itself.” MAX WEBER, 3 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 953 (1968). 
188. Jens Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to 
Citizens Consensus, in LEGITIMACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL POLITICS 175 (Achim 
Hurrelmann et al. eds., 2007). 
189. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 3 (1991). 
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deficit “‘imposes heavy costs on the controllers.’ . . . The 
efficiency advantages of authority probably motivate the 
commonly observed impulse of the powerful to try to legitimate 
their power.”190 Legitimacy is also valuable because it contributes 
to international stability. A widely shared perception of the 
legitimacy of the principal powers, institutions, ordering 
principles, and rules of global affairs is instrumental to the 
maintenance of stability in international affairs.191 
Second, legitimacy is important because it has the potential 
to shape future behavior. Legitimation is a communicative act of 
giving reasons.192 As Frederick Schauer explains, giving reasons 
is a process of justifying particular actions in specific contexts on 
the bases of general abstract principles.193 This structure of 
reason-giving is not unique to domestic politics. Justification in 
global politics, including in the high-stakes area of international 
security, functions in the same way.194 This appeal to general 
principles, especially if done repeatedly, creates a commitment, 
or at least a felt need, to react to similar situations in the future 
in accordance with these previously invoked principles.195 In 
other words, repeated justification creates precedents. Even if 
not determinative of every future case, precedent, if widely 
accepted, gradually contributes to shaping behavior by 
excluding policy options that are unjustifiable on the basis of 
established general principles.196 
                                                                                                                                     
190. Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 388 (1999) (quoting 
ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND WELFARE 115 
(Transaction Publishers, 2d ed. 1992 (1953)). 
191.  IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 82 (2005). 
192. Craig Matheson, Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy, 38 BRIT. J. 
SOC. 199, 200 (1987). 
193. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641–42 (1995). 
194. Martti Koskenniemi observed that justifications of Security Council action 
make “constant reference to normative codes, rules, or principles . . . They refer back 
to more general, systemic theories, assumptions, worldviews, and prejudices that 
provide the implicit matrix that makes description possible.” Martti Koskenniemi, The 
Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 455, 468 (1995–1996). 
195. Schauer, supra note 193, at 658. 
196. Although speaking of precedent in the context of the Common Law, I think 
the following observation by David Strauss also applies to justification in international 
politics. Speaking of the role played by judgments of fairness and sound social policy in 
judicial decision, Strauss says: “Even in the small minority of cases in which the law is 
disputed, the correct answer will sometimes be clear. And—perhaps the most 
important point—even when the outcome is not clear, and arguments about fairness 
and good policy come into play, the precedents will usually limit the possible outcomes 
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States, including Great Powers, are cognizant of this power 
of principle and the pull of precedent.197 This is exhibited in the 
care exercised by governments not to justify their policies in 
terms that may undermine their interests or freedom of action 
in future settings.198 This is also manifested in the conscious 
attempts of states and many other actors active in global 
governance to promote, propagate, and ultimately establish as 
dominant, versions of legitimacy that conform to their 
normative commitments and interests. This process of shaping 
what counts as appropriate behavior in international affairs by 
instrumentally ‘engineering’ perceptions of legitimacy has been 
termed “strategic social construction.”199 
In a sense, therefore, the legitimacies of humanitarian war, 
to which we now turn, should be viewed not solely as attempts to 
                                                                                                                                     
that a judge can reach.” DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 39 (2010). Ryan 
Goodman makes a similar point in the context of justifying war waged for 
humanitarian purposes: “[T]he imagery and justifications that leaders use to build 
support for their policies at one stage of hostilities constrain their actions at later 
stages.” Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 107, 123 (2006). Nothing here should be read as suggesting that precedent, whether 
in judicial practice or international relations, will be determinative of each and every 
future political situation or case. Just as precedent can be overturned in the Common 
Law, precedent may be disregarded in international relations. 
197. For example, in his magna opus, Henry Kissinger celebrated the genius of 
Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Klemens von Metternich for constructing the post-
Napoleonic political order “not by marshalling superior force, but by obtaining a 
voluntary submission to his version of legitimacy.” HENRY KISSINGER, A WORLD 
RESTORED 321 (1957). 
198. Incidentally, the Kosovo War and the subsequent declaration of 
independence by Kosovo are prime examples of the care exercised by Great Powers to 
avoid setting precedents that may undermine their interests in future settings. In the 
aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo War, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright was careful 
to signal that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo should not be viewed as a precedent for 
future intervention by the alliance for humanitarian purposes. See Madeleine Albright, 
US Sec'y of State, Prepared Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 28, 
1999, available at http://www.cfr.org/nato/prepared-remarks-secretary-state-madeleine-
k-albright/p3189. Similarly, countries that supported the independence of Kosovo 
repeatedly declared that this was a sui generis case that should not set a precedent in 
favor of secession in other regions of the world. See Rein Mullerson, Precedents in the 
Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 2 (2009). 
199. Strategic social construction is a process where actors make “detailed means-
ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize 
involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative 
commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.” Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, 
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 910 (1998). 
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revisit the UN Charter jus ad bellum scheme, but also as a bid to 
establish a humanitarian version of legitimacy as the globally 
dominant normative framework. Realizing the potency of 
legitimacy, proponents of the humanitarian thesis sought to 
reshape perceptions of legitimacy as part of their project to 
establish a law-governed community of humankind. In other 
words, the humanitarian critique of the rules and institutions of 
jus ad bellum represents far more than “a minor exception or 
adjustment to the received organization of the human race. 
Instead, it arguably exemplified and acted as the doctrinal 
advance guard of the whole constellation of forces confronting 
the sovereign state’s once indisputable claim to be the principle 
locus of power and loyalty.”200 
My typology of justifications of humanitarian war includes 
three categories. The differentiating feature between these 
categories is their relationship to the existing jus ad bellum 
scheme, which means the extent to which each category takes 
this Charter scheme as its point of departure to justify 
humanitarian war. To express this, I draw on the principles of 
lex specialis and lex generalis.201 The first category of legitimation 
techniques seeks to fit humanitarian war within the structure of 
the UN Charter scheme. That is why I call this category ‘Lex 
Specialis Legitimacy.’ The second category I label ‘Lex Generalis 
Legitimacy’ because it justifies humanitarian war on the grounds 
of general international law as opposed to the specific rules of 
jus ad bellum. The third and final category is called ‘Moral 
Legitimacy’ because, instead of drawing on international law, it 
justifies humanitarian war on extra-legal bases inspired by the 
just war tradition. 
                                                                                                                                     
200. Tom Farer, Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and 
Legitimacy, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 
55 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., 2003). 
201. The maxim lex specialis derogat legi generalis expresses the principle that 
‘specific’ law shall overrule ‘general’ law. This means that should a conflict emerge 
between two principles of law, the more specialized law or the body of law most 
relevant to the question at hand shall overrule other general principles of international 
law. In the case of justifying humanitarian war, which is a question relating to the resort 
to armed force in international relations, the lex specialis is jus ad bellum. For a detailed 
examination of this maxim, see Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the 
Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006). 
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A. Lex Specialis Legitimacy 
Because of thy law am I content with thee, O state! 
     -Roscoe Pound202 
Legitimizing exercises of coercion, such as the resort to 
war, on the grounds of preexisting rules is a well-trodden 
justificatory path. Indeed, etymologically, legitimacy, or legitimus 
as it was referred to in Roman law, was originally understood as 
acting in conformity with the law.203 The lure of legal 
legitimation is that it justifies policy, not on transient interests or 
arbitrary freedom, but on properly enacted preexisting rules.204 
In this case, the relevant body of rules is the UN Charter-based 
jus ad bellum scheme, which, as discussed above, is predicated on 
a general prohibition on the use of force that admits two 
exceptions: self-defense and Security Council-authorized 
enforcement action. Therefore, attempts to fit unilateral 
humanitarian war within this legal structure take the form of 
intellectual moves that seek to expand the avenues through 
which armed force can legally be exercised in international 
relations. 
1. Parsing the Words 
The first move to justify humanitarian war according to the 
existing jus ad bellum scheme adopts a reading of article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter that considerably shrinks the breadth of the 
general prohibition on the use of force in international 
relations. According to this provision, UN members “shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” Some proponents of the 
humanitarian thesis consider the words “territorial integrity and 
political independence” as constituting the limits of the general 
                                                                                                                                     
202. Roscoe Pound, The Case for Law, 1 VAL. U. L. REV. 201, 214 (1967). 
203. CLARK, supra note 191, at 17. 
204. Matheson, supra note 192, at 210; see also Richard Fallon, “The Rule of Law” As 
a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) (explaining that the 
rule of law is predicated on “reasoned elaboration of the connection between 
recognized, pre-existing sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and 
responsibilities in particular cases”). 
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prohibition on the use of force enacted by article 2(4). Some 
governments have also adopted this reading of the Charter, 
albeit in different circumstances.205 
According to this approach, force used for purposes other 
than threatening the territorial integrity of states, such as by 
altering a country’s boundaries, or undermining its political 
independence by for example imposing a political leadership, is 
justifiable according to the text of article 2(4).206 It is, therefore, 
argued that since a “genuine humanitarian intervention does 
not result in territorial conquest or political subjugation,” 
waging war to protect civilians is not proscribed by the UN 
Charter.207 
Furthermore, proponents of the humanitarian thesis 
maintain that the rise of human rights and the receding of 
sovereignty transformed the meaning of the phrase “political 
independence” as used in article 2(4). As Michael Reisman 
contends, the right of every state to enjoy political 
independence is conditional on upholding and protecting 
human rights. Failure to fulfill that obligation deactivates the 
right to political independence and constitutes permissible 
grounds for forcibly intervening to protect civilians.208 
2. Implicit Approval and Ex Post Facto Ratification 
The second move made to justify war fought for 
humanitarian purposes on the grounds of the existing jus ad 
bellum scheme seeks to broaden the means through which the 
                                                                                                                                     
205. During the hearings of the Corfu Channel case before the ICJ, the United 
Kingdom argued that a right of forcible self-help continues to be recognized in 
international law as long as exercising this right does not entail threatening the 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Unlike uses of force for 
humanitarian purposes, self-help entails the use of force by a state to protect legal 
rights that have been infringed by another state. See Statement by Sir Eric Beckett on 
Nov. 12 1948. Some Third World countries and the former Soviet Union also used 
similar arguments when justifying uses of force to assist colonized peoples achieve 
independence. The prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4), 
according to this argument, did not apply to situations of decolonization. See: DINSTEIN, 
supra note 117, at 92. 
206. See for example: Waldock, supra note 125, at 493. 
207. FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND 
MORALITY 151 (2d ed. 1997); C.F. Amerasinghe, The Conundrum of Recourse to Force—To 
Protect Persons, 3 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 7 (2006). 
208. W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 861 (1999). 
600 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551 
Security Council expresses its approval of enforcement action. 
Originally, the drafters of the Charter intended for the Security 
Council to take direct charge of the execution of enforcement 
measures through a Military Staff Committee composed of the 
Chiefs of Staff of the P5.209 The realities of the Cold War, 
however, prevented this committee from ever fulfilling its 
mandate or concluding agreements with member states 
pursuant to which their armed forces would have been available 
for deployment by the Security Council.210 
History, however, confirmed the prescience of Justice 
Holmes’ remark that words are “the skin of living thought.”211 
UN practice evolved beyond the strictures of the Charter by 
permitting the Security Council to delegate individual states or 
coalitions of states to execute enforcement action on its 
behalf.212 The formula routinely used by the Security Council to 
express its assent to the resort to armed force is the adoption of 
a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter in which it uses 
the phrase “all necessary measures,” which is unanimously 
understood to mean an authorization to use force in the 
execution of the mandate contained in the resolution.213 Passing 
such a resolution requires the affirmative vote of nine of the 
Council’s fifteen members, including the P5, which, as in the 
cases of Kosovo and Syria, is not always forthcoming. 
To circumvent this process of explicit authorizations of the 
use of force, advocates of the humanitarian thesis proposed 
alternative means through which Security Council may be 
considered to have approved enforcement action. One of these 
is “implicit authorization.” In the days following the 
commencement of Operation Allied Force, as NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo was codenamed, a number of countries 
                                                                                                                                     
209. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. 
210. See Richard Bruning, The United Nations’ Military Staff Committee: Future or 
Failure? 13 MIL. L. & WAR L. REV. 35 (1974); Jonathan Soffer, All for One or All for All: 
The UN Military Staff Committee and the Contradictions of American Internationalism, 21 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 45 (1997). 
211. Towne v. Eisner 245 U.S. 418 (1918). 
212. DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 3–50, 142–67 (1999); see also John Quigley, The Privatization of 
Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 249, 
277 (1995) (arguing that the practice of the Security Council suggests that the “Charter 
is being amended in a de facto way.”). 
213. See CORTEN, supra note 117, at 312–13. 
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and regional organizations declared that they considered the 
operation a breach of international law because it was 
unauthorized by the Security Council.214 In response, the US 
Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister intimated 
that previous Security Council resolutions provided bases for the 
ongoing bombing of Serbia.215 The fact that the Security Council 
passed three resolutions under Chapter VII on the situation in 
Kosovo prior to the commencement of hostilities,216 two of 
which declared the conflict to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security,217 was viewed as providing 
implicit Security Council authorization for the use of force.218 
This argument was also employed to justify the forceful 
protection of civilians in other contexts, including the no-fly 
zones established by the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France over northern and southern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf 
War,219 and the 1990 ECOMOG intervention in Liberia.220 
                                                                                                                                     
214. Understandably, Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations issued a fiery 
statement that expressed outrage at the NATO operation and emphasized that “those, 
who are involved in this unilateral use of force against the sovereign FRY carries out in 
violation of the UN Charter and without authorization from the Security Council, 
should realize the serious responsibility they pay.” Similarly, China announced that the 
bombing represented a “blatant violation of the UN Charter as well as the accepted 
norms in international law.” The Rio Group also expressed “anxiety” at the hostilities, 
and argued that the Security Council is the entity charged with the primary 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. See THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: 
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS 727–37 (Philip Auerswald & David 
Auerswald eds., 2000). South Africa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement 
in which it “noted with grave concern the current military action against the sovereign 
state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is in violation of the UN Charter and 
accepted norms of international law . . . . The erosion of the UN Charter and the 
authority of the Security Council cannot be tolerated by the international community.” 
KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 493. 
215. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 214, at 742 (remarks by Secretary of State Albright); id., at 735 (remarks by 
French Foreign Minister Vedrin). 
216. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/11 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998). 
217. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/11(9 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1203 (1998). 
218. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Legal Basis for the Action Taken by 
NATO, March 25, 1999; see Nico Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: 
Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 59, 82 (1999). 
219. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Kurdish population of northern Iraq 
and the Shiite majority residing in the southern provinces led a rebellion against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Expectedly, the latter unleashed a brutal campaign of 
repression, especially against the Kurds in the north, which led to an increase in 
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In addition to citing Security Council resolutions adopted 
prior to the commencement of hostilities, it was suggested that 
the Council could approve armed intervention undertaken to 
protect civilians retroactively by passing resolutions after the 
termination of armed operations. I call this form of legitimation 
ex post facto ratification. On June 10, 1999, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII, which established an 
international security and administrative presence in Kosovo 
and outlined the contours of a political settlement to the 
conflict. These aspects of the resolution were considered to 
constitute a form of recognition by the Council of the results of 
NATO’s intervention, which, for some scholars, “effectively 
ratified what earlier might have constituted unilateral action 
questionable as a matter of law.”221 
The failure of the Security Council to condemn an armed 
intervention, or reproach those executing it, has also been 
repeatedly advanced as a form of ex post facto ratification.222 
During Operation Allied Force, Russia, India, and Belarus 
submitted a joint draft resolution demanding the cessation of 
hostilities to the Security Council.223 The fact that this resolution 
was rejected has been considered indicative of the Council’s 
acquiescence to the then-ongoing military operations in Kosovo. 
Similarly, in the aftermath of the ECOMOG intervention in 
Liberia, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement 
                                                                                                                                     
refugee flows from these areas into neighboring countries. As part of the international 
response to these developments, the no-fly zones were established to deny Saddam 
Hussein’s troops the advantage of air superiority. 
220. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(“ECOMOG”) was established by the Economic Community of West African States 
(“ECOWAS”) to intervene in the Liberian civil war to, inter alia, restore law and order, 
release political prisoners, and prepare the country for free and fair elections. See Jules 
Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use 
Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 126 (1999). 
221. Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 824, 827 (1999); see THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 170, at 172. For an 
extended discussion, see TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89–90 (2005). 
222. An early example of this argument was used by the United States to justify its 
quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Abram Chayes, Law and the 
Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556 (1963) (“[S]urely it is no more surprising 
to say that failure of the Security Council to disapprove regional action amounts to 
authorization . . . .”). 
223. For the text of the draft resolution and excerpts of the discussion that ensued 
in the Security Council on the proposed text, see KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 432. 
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and then adopted Resolution 788. Not only did these 
documents fail to condemn what had been an unauthorized use 
of force, they commended the intervention for its contribution 
to peace and stability in the region.224 
B. Lex Generalis Legitimacy 
The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life 
     -2 Corinthians 3:6 
To most states and many scholars, including some 
advocates of the humanitarian thesis, these justifications for 
waging humanitarian war were unconvincing. Oscar Schachter, 
for example, remarked that reading article 2(4) as permitting 
the resort to force to protect civilians “requires an Orwellian 
interpretation” of its terms.225 Meanwhile, Michael Reisman 
commented that theories such as implicit authorization and ex 
post facto ratification unsuccessfully attempt to weave a 
“retrospective tapestry of authority” on interventions that 
breach the relevant UN Charter rules.226 
Desirous of deploying legality to legitimate humanitarian 
war, but cognizant of the difficulty of fitting this form of 
intervention within the doctrinal and institutional framework of 
the existing jus ad bellum scheme, a number of countries and 
scholars invoked principles and doctrines of general 
international law to justify war waged to protect civilians. I call 
this form of justification lex generalis legitimation. 
                                                                                                                                     
224. See generally, S.C. Res. 788, U.N.Doc.S/RES/788 (Nov. 19 1992); Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the 
Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 361, 375 (2000). 
225. SCHACHTER, supra note 140, at 118; see Mehrdad Payandeh, The United 
Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 359–360 
(2011) (“[I]nternational courts and the majority of international lawyers have until 
now been unwilling to restrict the scope of Article 2(4) of the Charter or enlarge the 
possible grounds for the justification of the use of force.”); Richard Falk, Kosovo, World 
Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 853 (1999) (“In essence, 
the textual level of analysis, upon which legalists rely, cannot give a satisfactory basis for 
NATO intervention. . . .”). 
226. Reisman, supra note 208, at 860; see also Gray, supra note 129, at 91 
(describing attempts to bestow Security Council authorization on interventions such as 
Kosovo as “extremely controversial.”). 
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1. Human Rights and the Purposes of the United Nations 
The principal purpose of the United Nations is the 
prevention of war and the maintenance of inter-state peace.227 
World War II and the atrocities perpetrated by the Axis powers 
convinced the organization’s founding fathers, however, that 
achieving this central objective required enabling the United 
Nations to deal with the root causes of conflict, including the 
economic, social, and humanitarian sources of instability.228 
Chapter I of the Charter, titled “The Purposes of the United 
Nations,” bears evidence of this bold ambition. While article 
1(1) tasks the organization with protecting peace and 
suppressing aggression, article 1(3) directs it to promote and 
encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion.”229 
This identification of the protection human rights as an 
aim to be pursued by the United Nations is routinely cited by 
proponents of the humanitarian thesis to demonstrate that the 
resort to armed force in the service of this objective comports 
with the overall purposes of the United Nations, and thus, with 
general international law.230 To support this claim, reference is 
also made to the closing line of article 2(4). As discussed above, 
this provision prohibits the resort to force in any “manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”231 
Invoking these words in combination of the Charter provisions 
on human rights, some proponents of the humanitarian thesis 
argue that war waged to protect civilians is legally legitimate 
because it serves one of the purposes of the United Nations.232  
                                                                                                                                     
227. Wolfrum, supra note 120, at 42 (considering the maintenance of 
international peace and security to be the “overarching purpose of the United 
Nations”). 
228. KENNEDY, supra note 135, 45–46. 
229. UN Charter art. 1. 
230. See Malvina Halberstam, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1995). 
231. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
232. Marc Weller, Forcible Humanitarian Action: The Case of Kosovo, in REDEFINING 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 319 (Michael Bothe, Mary 
Ellen O’Connell & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2005). Ronald Dworkin adopted a similar 
approach in one of his final pieces, noting, “[w]e might understand the ‘Purposes of 
the United Nations’ cited in article 2(4) to be those that flow from the moral 
responsibility nations had to create that institution: the responsibility to protect people 
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2. Parallel Custom, Emerging Custom, and Instant Custom 
Despite its monumental importance, the UN Charter 
remains only a single treaty within the broader universe of 
international law. The Charter, even in the area of the 
regulation of the use of force in international relations, does not 
incorporate the entire corpus of relevant rules of international 
law.233 This reality, coupled with the difficulty of interpreting the 
Charter as permitting unilateral humanitarian war,234 led many 
proponents of the humanitarian thesis to argue that waging war 
to protect civilians without Security Council authorization is 
legally legitimate on the basis of customary international law. 
Invoking custom to justify humanitarian war has taken a 
number of forms. The first of these argues that a customary 
right of unilateral armed humanitarian intervention exists in 
parallel to the treaty-based jus ad bellum Charter scheme. Most 
scholars agree that prior to the adoption of the UN Charter in 
1945, customary international law recognized a right of 
intervention to prevent the perpetration of mass atrocities.235 
Advocates of the right to wage humanitarian war argue that this 
body of customary rules remained largely intact despite the 
entry into force of the UN Charter with its general prohibition 
on the use of force.236  
                                                                                                                                     
from the dangers of the insulated sovereignty of the Westphalian system.” Ronald 
Dworkin, A New Philosophy of International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 23 (2013). 
233.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27) (separate opinion of President Nagendra Singh) (the 
UN Charter “by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of force in 
international relations”). 
234. For example, the UK House of Commons noted in a report published in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo War that, “Operation Allied Force was contrary to the specific 
terms of what might be termed the basic law of the international community—the UN 
Charter.” FOREIGN AFF. COMM., FOURTH REPORT, 1999–2000, H.C. 28-II, at para 48 
(U.K.) available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/
cmfaff/28/2802.htm. 
235. See e.g., Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
203, 235 (1973). 
236. Scholars making this argument usually frame their claim in terms of the 
continued existence of a right of ‘self-help’ that survived the adoption of the UN 
Charter. According to this view, a failure of the UN collective security mechanism 
unlocks a state’s right to use force to protect internationally guaranteed rights. This 
principle of self-help, the argument goes, also applies to the use of force to uphold 
internationally recognized human rights. See, e.g., Richard Lillich, Forcible Self-Help By 
States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 346 (1968). In a similar move, 
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Even if it were conceded that the UN Charter overruled 
earlier customary norms and proscribed the use of force to 
protect civilians except with the authorization of the Security 
Council, some scholars and states contended that customary law 
evolved since 1945 to recognize an emerging right of forceful 
humanitarian intervention. Speaking at Security Council 
meeting in the aftermath of the Kosovo War, the Dutch 
Ambassador to the United Nations encouraged delegations that 
had expressed reservations about the legality of NATO’s 
intervention to “realize that the Charter is not the only source of 
international law,” and to accept that “since the day it was 
drafted, the world has witnessed a gradual shift . . . making 
respect for human rights more mandatory and respect for 
sovereignty less absolute.”237 As a result of this shift, it is argued 
that customary international law has come to recognize a right 
to the use of force unilaterally to protect civilians against mass 
human rights violations.238 To corroborate this claim, a number 
of armed interventions undertaken for humanitarian purposes 
since 1945 are cited as evidence of state practice supporting a 
customary right of forceful intervention.239 
To further buttress claims of an emergent customary right 
of armed humanitarian intervention, proponents of the 
humanitarian thesis deploy arguments associated with the 
constitutionalization of international law discussed earlier in this 
paper. During oral pleadings in a case filed before the ICJ by 
Yugoslavia against NATO member states for their participation 
in the Kosovo War, Belgium submitted that international law 
had recognized that the prevention of the violent repression of 
human rights, including through the resort to force, was taking 
                                                                                                                                     
Michael Glennon argued that repeated violations of the general prohibition on the use 
of force enshrined in article 2(4) of the Charter have effectively extinguished this rule, 
and reinstated the freedom of states to resort to force that existed in the pre-Charter 
era. See MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AFTER KOSOVO 62–64 (2001). 
237. U.N.S.C., Rep. of the Security Council, Jun. 10, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4011. 
238. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the NATO Intervention in 
Kosovo, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 926, 931 (2000). 
239. For a survey of these incidents and views regarding the precedential value of 
these examples of state practice, see SEAN MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE 
UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 83–116 (1996). See also Christopher 
Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141, 
161–71 (2002). 
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precedence over sovereignty. This, Belgium reasoned, was 
because intervention to protect civilians facing the threat of 
mass atrocities serves “essential values which also rank as jus 
cogens.”240 In other words, the normative hierarchization of 
international law and the rise to preeminence of human rights 
overturned basic tenets of international law, such as sovereignty 
and non-intervention, and cast doubts over the relevance and 
utility of the Charter jus ad bellum scheme. 
Scholars have also echoed the view that the humanization 
of the values of international law challenges the doctrinal and 
institutional components of jus ad bellum. Michael Reisman, for 
example, has argued that sovereignty today is understood not as 
state sovereignty, but as popular sovereignty.241 Therefore, the UN 
Charter, with article 2(4) at its epicenter, ought to be 
interpreted and implemented with view to protecting popular 
sovereignty and enhancing opportunities for self-determination. 
This inevitably transforms the standard against which the 
legitimacy of armed intervention is tested. Complying with the 
strictures of the Charter or obtaining Security Council 
authorization is no longer considered necessary for the legality 
of uses of force. Rather, waging war is evaluated on the basis of 
whether it increases “the probability of the free choice of 
peoples about their government and political structure.”242 This 
means that forceful intervention in the pursuit of popular 
sovereignty may be undertaken not only to prevent mass 
atrocities, but also to remove despotic regimes and promote 
democracy.243 
                                                                                                                                     
240. KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 507. These arguments were made during 
hearings held by the ICJ regarding the case filed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
against NATO member states for their participation in the Kosovo War. It is noteworthy 
that Belgium was the only NATO member state to justify its participation the conflict 
on the basis of an emerging customary right to wage humanitarian war. 
241. Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: Major Trends of 
Development 1980-2010, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 460 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et. al. eds., 2010). 
242. W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 
2(4), 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 642, 644 (1984). 
243. W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 804–05 (1995); see ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT BECK, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 177–202 (1993); W. Michael Reisman, Why 
Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 516 (1998).  
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Uncertainties regarding the status of unauthorized 
humanitarian war as a customary principle244 led some scholars 
to argue that, despite having violated existing treaty-based and 
customary international law, the Kosovo War may still have been 
legitimate because it gave birth to a novel customary rule.245 
Custom is defined as “general practice accepted as law.”246 This 
definition is unpacked into two components: an objective 
element formed of the actual practice of states; and a subjective 
element consisting of a belief held by states that their practice 
arises out of a sense of legal obligation.247 The claim that the 
Kosovo War established a customary rule permitting unilateral 
uses of force for humanitarian purposes is predicated on the 
theory of “instant custom.”248 Despite the terminological 
contradiction inherent in the phrase “instant custom,”249 this 
theory is based on the claim that only a limited amount of state 
practice needs to have accreted in a brief period of time to 
satisfy the constituent elements of custom.250 Therefore, a single 
                                                                                                                                     
244. For example, a memorandum prepared by the Planning Staff of the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the permissibility of armed intervention noted 
that “[t]he state practice to which advocates of the right of humanitarian intervention 
have appealed provides an uncertain basis on which to rest such a right. . . . In fact, the 
best case that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be 
said to be unambiguously illegal.” Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materials on 
International Law 1986, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 487, 618–19 (1986). 
245. Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 23, 30 (1999) (observing that “it is not an exceptional occurrence that new 
standards emerge as a result of a breach of lex lata”). 
246. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to U.N. Charter). 
247. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
23–25 (8th ed. 2012). 
248. The theory was first proposed in: Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on 
Outer Space: ‘“Instant’” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965). 
249. Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 371 (1998). 
250. Michael Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary 
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 440 
(2010). In support of this theory, reference is usually made to the following segment of 
the judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case: 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of 
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on 
the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it 
might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially 
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incident, such as the Kosovo War, if accepted, or at least not met 
with considerable objections, could establish, even instantly, a 
new customary rule.251 
3. Necessity, Mitigation, and Absurdity 
General international law recognizes that in certain 
situations states may be compelled to violate international law to 
protect essential interests from grave and imminent peril.252 The 
doctrinal expression of this rule is the concept of necessity, 
according to which these exceptional circumstances absolve 
states of the wrongfulness resulting from their violation of 
international law.253 Necessity, or variations thereof, has been 
repeatedly invoked by supporters of a right to wage unilateral 
humanitarian war. For example, speaking before the Security 
Council during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the US 
representative noted that Operation Allied Force was “necessary 
to respond to Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar 
Albanians. . . . We have begun today’s action to avert this 
humanitarian catastrophe.”254 Similarly, the British Permanent 
Representative declared that “[t]he action being taken is legal. 
It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”255 Similar arguments 
were also made during debates over the legality of military 
intervention in the Syrian civil war in the absence of an 
authorization from the Security Council.256 
                                                                                                                                     
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense 
of the provision invoked . . . . 
Case Concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. (Feb. 20).  
251. Sean Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident?, 94 PROC. 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 302, 303 (2000) (suggesting that analysts of the Kosovo War “must 
consider the precedential value of Kosovo as a law-shaping incident”); see  John Currie, 
NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo: Making or Breaking International Law?, 36 
CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 303, 327 (1998). 
252. Ian Johnstone, The Plea of ‘“Necessity”‘ in International Legal Discourse: 
Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 357 
(2004). 
253. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 
2001, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).  
254. KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 425. 
255. Id., at 429. 
256. In a document released by the British Government outlining its position 
regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria, it was argued that force may be used 
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The central move made by proponents of this form of 
justification is to invoke the exceptional nature of the 
circumstances faced by NATO during the Kosovo conflict that 
left no option but to resort to force without Security Council 
approval. The history of the Milosevic regime, the conflict that 
ravaged the Balkans during the early 1990s, the failure of 
attempts at a political settlement between Belgrade and the 
Kosovar Albanian leadership, the ethnic nature of the civil strife 
in Kosovo, the documentation of grave crimes committed by 
Serbian troops in Kosovo, and most significantly, the prospect of 
a Russo-Chinese double veto in the Security Council against 
proposals for forceful intervention were all case-specific facts 
that converged to establish a situation of necessity that justified 
the resort to force.257 Ultimately, “the unlawfulness of the act 
was mitigated, to the point of exoneration, in the circumstances 
in which it occurred.”258 
In a sense, grounding the legitimacy of humanitarian war 
on the doctrine of necessity mimics the absurdity doctrine that is 
familiar in domestic legal systems.259 According to this doctrine, 
the plain meaning of a legal instrument, be it the Constitution 
or a statute, may be overturned if “the absurdity and injustice of 
applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous, that 
all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the 
application.”260 Obviously, when drafting legal texts, legislators 
do not intend to produce absurd or, in the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                     
without Security Council authorization as “exceptional measures in” order to “alleviate 
the scale of overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. . . . Such a legal basis is available 
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention . . . . ” Chemical Weapon Use By Syrian 
Regime: UK Government Legal Position, UNITED KINGDOM (Aug. 29, 2013), https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-
government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-
position-html-version. 
257. THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 170, at 173–75. 
258. Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
DILEMMAS, supra note 200, at  204, 226 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., 2003). 
259. See Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative 
Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & 
Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). 
260. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 203 (1819); see also United States v. 
Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868) (“All laws should receive a sensible construction. 
General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, 
oppression, or an absurd consequence.”). 
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just-quoted words, “monstrous” results. Nonetheless, absurdity 
may occur because statutes are framed in general terms so as to 
apply to future unforeseeable situations. Given the bounded 
rationality of legislators and the imprecision of language, 
generally framed texts may generate either over-specificity or 
under-inclusiveness when applied in future settings that involve 
previously unimagined fact-patterns or circumstances.261 
Therefore, the absurdity doctrine enables courts to avoid 
applying the plain meaning of generally framed legal texts if it 
impinges on core social values.262 Scholars sympathetic towards 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo drew on the absurdity doctrine 
to justify the intervention. A clear and plain reading of the UN 
Charter, it was admitted, does not foresee the possibility of 
resorting to force for humanitarian purposes without Security 
Council approval. Nevertheless, complying with the strictures of 
the Charter in situations of extreme humanitarian necessity, 
such as the Kosovo conflict, would be an untenable reductio ad 
absurdum, which justifies an exceptional departure from the 
Charter-based jus ad bellum scheme.263 
A noteworthy feature of legitimation on the bases of 
necessity, mitigation, absurdity or similar concepts is their 
relatively less consequential policy implications. The various 
forms of lex specialis legitimation and lex generalis legitimation on 
the grounds of either treaty provisions or customary law all 
modify the rules governing the resort to force in international 
relations. Whether one restricts the ambit of article 2(4), 
invokes article 1(3), cites customary law existing in parallel to 
the UN Charter, or contends that new custom has been 
established, all of these justifications broaden the grounds on 
which states may lawfully wage war. Invoking necessity, 
mitigation, or absurdity, however, entails an admission of the 
illegality of the resort to force without Security Council 
                                                                                                                                     
261. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Indeterminacy, in AUTHORITY REVISITED, 
NOMAS XXIX 31–33 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1987). 
262. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2402 (2002); 
see also Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1007 (2006) (“If an 
application of plain statutory language would undermine sufficiently important values 
of the legal system, courts presume that the legislature would not have intended such a 
result.”). 
263. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 171–72 (2002). 
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approval. In other words, this form of justification keeps the 
Charter scheme essentially intact, but seeks exculpation for 
specific cases in light of exceptional circumstances necessitating 
the use of force to avoid an impending peril. This explains why 
NATO member states and many scholars favored this approach 
to justify the Kosovo War. Deconstructing the general 
prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the Charter and 
undermining the authority of the Security Council would 
establish dangerous precedents that could be invoked by 
adversaries in future settings, and could increase incidences of 
violence in international relations. Therefore, many NATO 
countries sought to downplay the precedential value of Kosovo 
and insist that it represents a sui generis exception to what is 
generally considered a valid system of law.264 
C. Moral Legitimacy 
If one person is able to save another and does not save him, 
he transgresses the commandment ‘Neither shalt thou stand 
idly by the blood of thy neighbor’ 
    -Moshe ben Maimonides265 
It is not inconceivable that in the operation of any legal 
system cases may arise where the properly enacted laws prescribe 
a certain course of action but where social morality, political 
necessity, or economic efficiency point in different directions.266 
In these circumstances, especially when the apparent conflict 
pits the dictates of legality against the requirements of morality, 
a troubling predicament appears. “[M]oral agents would have 
good moral reasons for rejecting those claims of law that they 
believe to be morally erroneous, just as law has good moral 
reasons for imposing its legal will on those moral agents who, 
                                                                                                                                     
264. Anthea Roberts, Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal But Justified?, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 195–96 (Philip Alston & 
Euan MacDonald eds., 2008). 
265. BRIAN LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 90 (2002) 
(quoting Moshe ben Maimonides). 
266. Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 
1728 (1988); see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1374 (1997) (“But at times, law requires us to do 
things that we think morally wrong, or prohibits us from doing things that we think 
morally correct.”). 
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from the law’s perspective, mistakenly refuse to accept the law’s 
wise guidance.”267 For countries and scholars who supported 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and called on the international 
community to use force to protect civilians in Syria, and more 
broadly for promoters of the humanitarian thesis, the moral 
obligation to save civilians from mass atrocities overrides other 
considerations, including legal niceties requiring Security 
Council approval.268 
The intellectual apparatus regularly employed to justify 
unilateral humanitarian war on moral grounds is the just war 
tradition,269 which is a “two thousand year old conversation 
about the legitimacy of war.”270 Although most authors speak of 
just war theory,271 I prefer the term the just war tradition which 
reflects the broad variety of views and occasional inconsistencies 
between writings in the field.272 Despite this diversity of 
perspectives, the general normative project of the just war 
tradition is to contain and limit violence in international affairs 
through the identification of the circumstances in which waging 
war would be morally permissible and outlining the conditions 
for the just execution of war.273 Although numerous elements 
                                                                                                                                     
267. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts 
Morality’s Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1587 (2007); see Larry 
Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 695–96 (1991). 
268. For example, speaking to the nation on March 24, 1999, President Clinton 
described the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and declared that “ending this 
tragedy is a moral imperative.” See KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 415. Similarly, the 
Secretary General of NATO announced that the alliance had a “moral duty” to 
intervene in the Kosovo crisis. See id. at 304. 
269. James Pattison, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, 26 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFFAIRS 1, 4 (2011) (highlighting that discussions of the ethics of humanitarian 
intervention “draw heavily on just war theory.”); see CORNELIU BJOLA, supra note 185, at 
7 (“The prevalent ethical tradition addressing the moral conditions under with the use 
of force can be legitimated is that of the just war theory.”). 
270. ALEX BELLAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 2 (2006). 
271. See, e.g., NICHOLAS FOTION, WAR AND ETHICS: A NEW JUST WAR THEORY 
(2007). 
272. See Anthony Coates, Humanitarian Intervention: A Conflict of Traditions, in 
XLVII NOMOS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 58, 59 (Terry Nardin & Melissa Williams 
eds., 2005). 
273. In other words, just war theory examines the morality of war from two angels. 
The first is judging the morality of waging war, while the second is evaluating whether 
war was conducted morally. This bifurcation of the questions examined by the just war 
tradition mimics the division of the body of international law dealing with armed 
conflict into a field relating to the legality of resorting to war; namely, jus ad bellum, and 
a field dealing with the means and methods of war, which is jus in bello. See STEVEN P. 
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have been proposed as criteria for evaluating the moral 
permissibility of waging war, three core indicators appear to 
enjoy the unanimous support of just war theorists. These are (1) 
just cause, (2) right intention, and (3) proper authority.274 
The first of these criteria, just cause, is understood as “a 
sufficient reason for war, a goal or ‘cause’ capable of justifying 
the terrible forms of action that war inevitably involves.”275 
Classical and modern writings in the just war tradition have 
proposed a broad range of causes justifying the resort to war, 
such as self-defense, deterring aggression, avenging wrongs, and 
protecting rights. Another just cause for waging war that has 
long been recognized by the just war tradition is saving foreign 
citizens from mass atrocities.276 A degree of uncertainty, 
however, surrounds the nature and gravity of the atrocities 
warranting forceful intervention. For some scholars, the threat 
or perpetration of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity constitute just causes for war, while 
others adopt the significantly lower threshold of preventing 
abuses of basic human rights.277 
Cognizant of the possibility that the existence of a just cause 
may be exploited to justify war waged for ulterior political 
motives, just war theorists developed the second component of 
this triad: right intention. Classically, right intent was 
                                                                                                                                     
LEE, ETHICS AND WAR 31 (2012). As discussed above, this Article does not examine jus 
in bello, and therefore, this Section will not examine debates about the moral 
justifiability of NATO’s conduct of military operations. 
274. These three criteria were formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas on the basis of 
the earlier writings of St. Augustine. See DINSTEIN, supra note 117, at 66. Other 
principles that have been identified by just war theorists and that have been applied in 
discussion on the legitimacy of humanitarian war include: (1) Last resort in the sense 
that other peaceful forms of intervention should either be exhausted or be deemed 
ineffective, (2) the use of force should produce more good than harm, (3) proportionality 
should be maintained between the objectives of the operations and the means used, 
and (4) reasonable prospects of success in ending human suffering. See Nicholas Wheeler, 
Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures, 2 MELB. J. INT’L L. 550, 
556–60 (2001). 
275. Jeff McMahan, Just War, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 88, at 669, 670. 
276. Gregory Reichberg, Jus ad Bellum, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 
23 (Larry May ed., 2009). 
277. See David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 173–76 
(1980) (proposing the protection of socially necessary human rights as a just cause of 
war). 
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understood as the requirement that war be waged with the 
intention of correcting evil or rectifying a wrong.278 In other 
words, a war waged in response to the just cause of a 
humanitarian crisis but with the intention of, for example, 
territorial aggrandizement, regime change, or assisting a 
particular belligerent, may be deemed unjust war for being 
fought for the wrong objectives.279 It was, therefore, unsurprising 
that British Prime Minister Tony Blair partially justified NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo by stating that “[t]his is a just war, based 
not on any territorial ambitions but on values.”280 
The third element of just war theory, proper authority, is 
perhaps its most pivotal component.281 Faced with the potential 
for abuse generated by the indeterminacy inherent in just cause, 
right intent, and other just war criteria, theorists recognized the 
importance of identifying a centralized authority to ascertain 
whether the just war conditions have been met and to authorize 
the use of force. In classical iterations of just war theory, that 
authority was the sovereign or the ruling prince.282 
Identifying the entity empowered to authorize waging 
humanitarian war was probably the most contentious aspect of 
the debate over the Kosovo War. Indeed, as discussed above, 
requiring Security Council approval to intervene to protect 
civilians has been the feature of the Charter-based jus ad bellum 
                                                                                                                                     
278. STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, 51 (2005). 
279. David Chandler, The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace, 11 
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 59, 70 (2004). 
280. Tom Buerkle, Blair Grabs Role as Alliance Hawk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/24/news/24iht-blair.2.t.html 
281. Laurie Calhoun, Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World, 27 
PEACE & CHANGE 37, 54 (2002) (explaining that because the other components of just 
war theory “are subject to rational dispute, legitimate authority becomes, in actual 
practice, the sole necessary condition for a nation’s waging of war”). 
282.  Farer, supra note 200, at 76 (explaining that St. Thomas Aquinas included 
proper authority among the just war criteria “to limit violence and strengthen order by 
delegitimating the use of force by lords all up and down the medieval hierarchy as well 
as outlaw groups—pirates and unemployed mercenaries, for example”). Aquinas’ 
rationale for identifying sovereigns as the sole authority capable of sanctioning the use 
of force also reflects the unique role ascribed to sovereigns in Aquinas’ political 
philosophy. The right of the sovereign to authorize the use of force to avenge wrongs 
or punish evildoers is an extension of the broader responsibility of the sovereign to 
serve and protect the common good of the community. See James Turner Johnson, 
Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed Force, 31 J. 
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 3, 10 (2003). 
616 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551 
scheme subjected to the greatest criticism by proponents of the 
humanitarian thesis. Therefore, numerous alternatives to 
Security Council approval were proposed. For example, Michael 
Walzer, a leading contemporary scholar of the just war tradition, 
argued that morality does not proscribe “unilateral action, so 
long as there is no immediate alternative available” and 
concluded that “any state capable of stopping the slaughter has 
the right, at least, to try to do so.”283 Uncomfortable with the 
prospect of abuse entailed in an open license for all states to 
wage unilateral humanitarian war, some scholars proposed 
limiting this right to democratic states or states that protect basic 
human rights.284 Meanwhile, mindful of the unique legitimacy of 
decisions adopted in accordance with the formal procedures of 
multilateral organizations, such as NATO or the African Union, 
some opined that armed intervention for humanitarian 
purposes executed by these organizations would overcome the 
dangers of unfettered unilateralism.285 Another institutional 
option that was proposed to legitimate armed intervention to 
protect civilians is for the intervening state or coalition of states 
to accept ex post facto international judicial review exercised by 
the ICJ and/or the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).286 
D. RtoP-Humanity’s Version 
As aforementioned, a common thread running throughout 
these three categories of legitimation is that they seek to revisit 
the rules governing the resort to force by states in international 
relations to permit unilateral forceful intervention to protect 
civilians from mass atrocities. In other words, the gap that the 
Kosovo War had uncovered between legality as expressed in the 
UN Charter and an emergent humanitarian legitimacy was to be 
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bridged by transforming the former to reflect the requirements 
of the latter.287 
For many supporters of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, 
and more broadly, for proponents of the humanitarian thesis, 
the most effective approach for achieving this objective was to 
formulate and codify criteria to both guide international 
intervention and provide a standard against which to test the 
legitimacy of these interventions. The impulse underlying these 
calls to set criteria to guide the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes appears to be the fear of the misuse of an unregulated 
right of unilateral intervention and a faith in the ability of 
codified rules to shape both state policies and the actions of 
international institutions.288  
Although countless sets of checklists and criteria were 
proposed by some governments289 and many scholars,290 the 
most prominent effort to devise guidelines to govern 
international intervention in humanitarian crises was the 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect (“RtoP”) that was first 
proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and 
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State Sovereignty (“ICISS”).291 Because the report issued by this 
commission has been thoroughly described, analyzed, 
applauded, and criticized in earlier works,292 discussion will be 
limited here to outlining its salient features and identifying the 
changes it proposed to the existing jus ad bellum scheme. 
RtoP, as proposed by the ICISS, is predicated on two 
theoretical moves. The first is the recasting of sovereignty from 
control to responsibility. Under the classical Westphalian 
framework described earlier in this Article, the state was 
presumed to enjoy limitless powers over individuals within its 
jurisdiction. The ICISS, however, argued that the emergence 
and growth of international human rights law and state practice 
since World War II upended this conception, thereby 
warranting the remolding of sovereignty into a responsibility of 
governments to uphold the rights and freedoms of their 
subjects.293 Second, RtoP shifted the debate from a right of 
intervention exercised by states to a responsibility towards 
individuals facing the threat of mass atrocities.294 While under 
the Westphalian anarchical image of the world states were 
viewed as autonomous, coequal sovereigns, this redefined 
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conception of sovereignty proposed a world order in which 
states are dually responsible for the protection of individuals 
within their jurisdiction before their own citizenry and the 
international community.295 
These moves, the Commission opined, are in line with the 
transformation of international relations “from a culture of 
violence to a more enlightened culture of peace,” which was 
spawned by the expansion of international human rights, 
humanitarian, and criminal law. These developments in 
international relations and international law ultimately 
discredited traditional understandings of security defined in 
terms of national borders and raison d’état, and gave rise to 
human security as an overarching paradigm through which to 
evaluate and determine security policy.296  
Having laid its intellectual foundations, which recreate 
many of the claims advanced by the constitutionalist and 
humanitarian theses in international law, the ICISS then 
outlined the policy components of RtoP. Primarily, ICISS 
emphasized that armed intervention is merely one of many tools 
available for responding to humanitarian crises. These tools 
were presented as a broad continuum of options ranging from 
preventive diplomacy to post-conflict reconstruction.297 Second, 
drawing heavily on the just war tradition, the ICISS proposed six 
criteria to guide international intervention in situations where 
civilians face the threat of mass atrocities. The just causes for 
intervention identified by the ICISS were situations of actual or 
apprehended large-scale loss of life, whether it was the result of 
state action, neglect, inability, or a failed state situation, and 
actual or apprehended ethnic cleansing.298 These circumstances, 
the report clarified, may occur due to the commission of crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or due to 
the breakdown of a state’s institutions, the eruption of a civil 
war, or the occurrence of a natural or environmental disaster. In 
these situations, it would be legitimate for the international 
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community to forcefully intervene both anticipatorily and to 
stop ongoing atrocities.299 
As to the right intention underlying forceful intervention, 
the report noted that the “primary purpose of the intervention 
must be to halt or avert human suffering,”300 thereby excluding 
regime change and territorial occupation as legitimate 
objectives of humanitarian war. The ICISS was cognizant, 
however, that domestic constituencies may require governments 
not use force except when necessary to serve national self-
interests. Therefore, the report advocated a conception of 
‘national’ interests that is both expansive and infused with a 
distinctive cosmopolitan flavor that would include matters of 
global concern, and argued that “these days, good international 
citizenship is a matter of national self-interest.”301 
The report’s third criterion for judging the legitimacy of 
armed humanitarian intervention is the requirement that force 
be employed as a last resort after peaceful measures had been 
explored. The fourth component of these criteria required that 
the force used be proportionate to the humanitarian objective 
of the intervention. Fifth, the report noted that the use of force 
would only be legitimate if it had reasonable prospects of 
succeeding in halting or preventing the loss of life.302 
The sixth and final criterion for determining the legitimacy 
of the use of force presented the greatest challenge to the 
existing jus ad bellum scheme. Seeking to identify the entity 
empowered to authorize waging humanitarian war, the ICISS 
noted that “there is no better or more appropriate body than 
the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for 
human protection purposes. It is the Security Council which 
should be making the hard decisions in the hard cases about 
overriding state sovereignty.”303 With Rwanda and Kosovo still 
recent history, however, the ICISS realized that Council’s 
unfettered powers and the unmatched influence of the P5 might 
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undermine its ability to effectively intervene to prevent mass 
atrocities. Therefore, the report advanced a number of 
proposals that alter the fundamental features of the UN Charter 
scheme. 
First, the P5 were encouraged to adopt an informal code of 
conduct according to which they would practice what was 
dubbed “constructive abstention,” whereby they would avoid 
using their vetoes to obstruct Council action in humanitarian 
crises.304 Second, the report argued that the responsibility of the 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security 
required effective and prompt intervention in situations involving 
large-scale loss of human life. Third, aware of the possibility that 
divergent interests among the P5 might lead the Council to 
deadlock, the report proposed resorting to two alternative 
institutions for securing approval for humanitarian war. The first 
was the General Assembly, which may legitimatly authorize the 
resort to armed force for humanitarian purposes through the 
Uniting for Peace mechanism. A second alternative was for 
regional organizations to intervene in humanitarian crises and 
seek ex post facto Security Council approval. 
Although these institutional aspects of the ICISS report 
represent the most obvious refashioning of the jus ad bellum 
scheme, the import and impact of the earlier five criteria should 
not be underappreciated. As described earlier, the drafters of 
the UN Charter envisaged the Security Council as an 
omnipotent body enjoying considerable discretion in deciding 
the appropriate policies to discharge its duties. Nothing, 
whether in the Charter or elsewhere, compels the Council to 
either deliberate on or respond to any crisis or conflict, 
including situations causing significant human suffering. 
However, adopting a set of just war-like criteria, even if worded 
in indeterminate terms such as “large-scale loss of life,” 
“proportionate means,” or “reasonable prospects of success,” 
diminishes the Council’s margin of appreciation. Such terms 
would invariably affect and shape debates on the Council and 
place pressure on its members to authorize intervention in 
humanitarian emergencies.305 In essence, the ICISS guidelines 
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would “lead to the ‘Gulliverization’ of the use of force by major 
global and regional powers, tying it with numerous threads of 
global norms and rules. Absent R2P, they have relatively more 
freedom, not less, to do what they want.”306  
This transformation in the modus operandi of the Security 
Council fits well with the global constitutionalist project and the 
humanitarian thesis, which is why I call this scheme proposed by 
the ICISS: RtoP-Humanity’s Version. For advocates of these 
approaches, the Security Council should not function as a Great 
Power oligarchy dedicated to ensuring the peaceful coexistence 
of territorially disjointed coequal sovereign states. Rather, the 
United Nations, with the Council at its core, is perceived as an 
institutional apparatus committed to safeguarding the values 
and interests of a global community of humankind.307 And much 
like the executive branch of national governments, in 
discharging its duties the Council is not legibus solutus. “[I]n a 
constitutionalizing international system, the traditional view of 
Security Council actions in a basically law-free realm is no longer 
tenable.”308 Instead, the Council becomes law-bound to uphold 
and promote communal values at the apex of which is the 
protection of human dignity.309 
Almost immediately, RtoP-Humanity’s Version attracted 
considerable academic attention and won important political 
endorsements, the most prominent of which came in a 2004 
report prepared by a High-Level Panel appointed by the UN 
Secretary General to examine contemporary sources of global 
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insecurity, and then from Kofi Annan himself in his report 
submitted to the 60th Session of the General Assembly. In the 
former report, most features of the ICISS report were replicated. 
First, although not openly jettisoning state security in favor of 
human security, the High-Level Panel emphasized the 
importance of taking the latter into consideration during the 
policy-making process at the United Nations.310 Second, the 
High-Level Panel adopted five of the six criteria proposed by the 
ICISS to determine the legitimacy of armed humanitarian 
intervention. The situations warranting armed intervention were 
identified as actual or apprehended harm to state or human 
security, and conflicts involving “genocide and other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended.”311 The 
purpose of intervention should be limited to halting or averting 
the threat to state or human security, and the scale, duration, 
and intensity of armed action should be restricted to the 
necessary means to achieve that purpose. Force should also be 
employed only as a last resort, and only after it had been 
determined that intervention stands a reasonable chance of 
success.312 In addition, the High-Level Panel advised the General 
Assembly and the Security Council to officially endorse these 
guidelines through declaratory resolutions. 
On the all-important question of legitimate authority, 
however, the High-Level Panel diverged from RtoP-Humanity’s 
Version and reaffirmed faith in the Security Council as 
“international community’s collective security voice.”313 
Alternative forums for authorizing the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes were not entertained, thereby preserving 
a core component of the classical jus ad bellum scheme. 
Nonetheless, the High-Level Panel called on the P5 to refrain 
from exercising their veto on resolutions dealing with situations 
of genocide or large-scale human rights abuses, thereby limiting 
the prerogatives of the Great Powers. 
                                                                                                                                     
310. Throughout the report, reference is made to both concepts as if to indicate 
that state and human security are two different approaches to security both of which 
should be considered in devising policies to confront sources of insecurity. See, e.g., 
UNSG High-Level Panel Report, supra note 119, at 11. 
311. Id. at 85–86. 
312. See id. 
313. Id. at 55. 
624 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551 
In his report, the UN Secretary General lauded the reports 
prepared by the ICISS and the High-Level Panel and 
encouraged the UN member states to embrace RtoP.314 
Substantively, the Secretary General closely followed the lead of 
the High-Level Panel, proposed guidelines for Security Council 
intervention that mirrored those advanced by the panel, and 
avoided offering alternative institutions to authorize the use of 
force. Unlike the ICISS and the High-Level Panel, however, the 
Secretary General did not call on the P5 to refrain from using 
the veto in matters relating to mass atrocities.315 
*** 
To conclude this Part, what the preceding typology of the 
legitimacies of humanitarian war reveals is that by mid-2005 the 
world was presented with a broad selection, or, if you may, a 
menu, of approaches that justify the resort to force to prevent 
mass atrocities. Albeit to varying degrees, all these legitimacies 
entailed revising the doctrinal and institutional structure of jus 
ad bellum. Whether one applies lex specialis legitimation to shrink 
the general prohibition on the use of force, or adopts lex 
generalis legitimation to argue that either customary law or 
necessity permit waging humanitarian war, or uses just-war 
criteria to justify armed intervention to prevent mass atrocities, 
the result is the transformation of jus ad bellum. Moreover, not 
only did realigning jus ad bellum to permit waging humanitarian 
war enjoy considerable enthusiasm in western scholarly and non-
governmental circles, but it also attracted palpable support from 
the global diplomatic officialdom. 
Moreover, unlike other proposed modifications to the rules 
governing the resort to force by states, and there were many 
both before and after Kosovo,316 these legitimacies of 
humanitarian war also represent an attempt at strategic social 
construction. As described above, jus ad bellum is a prime 
expression of the policy objectives and values of the law of 
coexistence, the purpose, or telos, of which is preserving peace 
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between states in an anarchic world. Arguments justifying 
humanitarian war and advocating RtoP-Humanity’s Version are, 
however, manifestations of the broader political project seeking 
to transform international relations from an anarchic statist 
order to a global community of humankind predicated on 
universal values and the rule of law.317 
Ultimately, however, as I argue in the next and final Part of 
this Article, this bid at strategic social construction failed. A 
conscious decision was made to reject RtoP-Humanity’s Version, 
and to reaffirm the existing rules, institutions, and statist values 
of jus ad bellum. 
III. RTOP-REALPOLITIK, GREAT POWER CONCERT, AND THE 
LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM 
The decision that I alluded to in the conclusion of the 
previous Part was taken at the 2005 World Summit, which was 
held at the opening of the 60th Session of the UN General 
Assembly.318 At its conclusion, the Summit adopted—by 
consensus—the World Summit Outcome Document (“WSOD”), 
which dealt with a wide range of global issues and problems.319 
Perhaps the most important sections of this document, or at 
least the ones that attracted the most scholarly attention and 
journalistic praise,320 were those dealing with the appropriate 
international reaction to humanitarian crises, which appear 
under the section titled “Responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.” 
This section of the WSOD represents the culmination of 
the global governmental and academic debate on the legality, 
legitimacy, and appropriateness of waging war for humanitarian 
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purposes sparked by the Kosovo War. As discussed earlier, 
NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo was widely considered to 
have been legitimate despite having violated international law. 
To many commentators this demonstrated the need to revisit 
the tenets of jus ad bellum, which reflected an anachronistic law 
of coexistence, to bring it in line with an emergent 
humanitarian legitimacy. Attempts to bridge this gap between 
legality and legitimacy gave rise to the various legitimacies of 
humanitarian war catalogued in the previous Part. The most 
prominent proposal for justifying the resort to war to prevent 
mass human suffering was what I called RtoP-Humanity’s Version, 
which not only enjoyed broad scholarly support, but also 
attracted endorsements from a number of governments and the 
UN Secretary General, who in his report submitted to the World 
Summit appealed to UN member states to “embrace the 
responsibility to protect, and when necessary, we must act on 
it.”321 
At the 2005 World Summit, however, RtoP-Humanity’s 
Version and all the other forms of legitimation that were 
proposed in the aftermath of Kosovo were rejected. Instead, an 
emasculated version of RtoP was adopted, which essentially kept 
the doctrinal architecture and institutional infrastructure of jus 
ad bellum intact. “The UN World Summit came to the very 
striking conclusion that no reform of the Charter provisions on 
collective security was needed.”322 
This becomes readily apparent once the relevant 
paragraphs of the WSOD are unpacked.323 As demonstrated in 
the table below, the various components of RtoP-Humanity’s 
Version that challenged the classical rules governing the resort to 
force were either modified or entirely dropped.324 First, the 
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categories of situations warranting resorting to war were 
narrowed to four specific crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Gone was the broader 
language proposed by the ICISS and the High-Level Panel that 
would have required armed intervention to stop large-scale 
losses of life, regardless of whether they amounted to these 
crimes, and that also included natural and environmental 
disasters. 
Second, the WSOD avoided indicating when intervention 
was required. Earlier versions of RtoP explicitly called for armed 
intervention in situations where loss of life was either 
apprehended or actually occurring. Third, whereas RtoP-
Humanity’s Version envisaged international armed intervention in 
cases where mass atrocities were imputable to direct state 
involvement, negligence or inability to protect civilians, or 
failed-state situations, the WSOD hinged the resort to force on 
demonstrating that national authorities were “manifestly failing” 
to protect civilians. Fourth, according to the WSOD, force would 
only be contemplated “should peaceful means be inadequate,” 
which is language that grants greater flexibility to the 
intervening powers than that suggested by both the ICISS and 
the High-Level Panel. Fifth, no mention was made in the WSOD 
of either the need to maintain proportionality between the 
humanitarian objectives of an intervention and the means 
adopted to execute the operation or the importance of ensuring 
that the protection of civilians was the principal intention of the 
intervening powers. 
Sixth, the language and tenor of RtoP-Humanity’s Version 
appear to confer on the international community a duty to 
intervene in situations where states fail to uphold their 
responsibility to protect civilians against mass atrocities. The 
WSOD, however, “points towards a voluntary, not mandatory, 
engagement . . . which again stands in contrast to the 
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assumption of a systematic duty.”325 This conclusion is gleaned 
from the noticeable difference in the nature of the international 
community’s commitment to, on the one hand, intervene 
peacefully to prevent mass atrocities, and on the other, to use 
armed force in these situations. The WSOD indicates that the 
international community bears a responsibility to intervene 
through peaceful means to prevent the perpetration of the four 
crimes mentioned above. If peaceful measures fail, however, the 
international community no longer bears a responsibility to 
intervene, but is only “prepared to take collective action . . . on a 
case-by-case basis.”326 In other words, according to the WSOD, 
should a situation arise—think of Libya, Syria, or similar 
conflicts—where genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
or ethnic cleansing occurs, nothing obliges the United Nations, 
the Security Council, or the international community at large to 
forcefully intervene to stop ongoing atrocities. 
Seventh, on the fundamental question of the body 
empowered to authorize the use of force to prevent or halt the 
perpetration of mass human rights violations, the WSOD 
unequivocally identified the Security Council as the sole entity 
enjoying that prerogative, thereby rejecting all the institutional 
alternatives that were proposed in the ICISS report. 
Furthermore, unlike the ICISS and High-Level Panel reports, 
the WSOD did not call on the P5 to refrain from exercising their 
veto power when voting on resolutions intended to authorize 
international intervention to prevent mass atrocities. 
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RtoP: From Humanity to Realpolitik 
 
 RtoP-Humanity’s Version RtoP-Realpolitik 
Just Cause Actual of apprehended 
large-scale loss of life, with 
or without genocidal intent.
 
Large scale “ethnic 
cleansing,” actual or 
apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, 
forced expulsion, acts of 
terror or rape. 
 
Situations of state collapse 
and the resultant exposure 
of the population to mass 
starvation and/or civil war. 
 
Overwhelming natural or 
environmental 
catastrophes, where the 
state concerned is either 
unwilling or unable to 
cope, or call for assistance, 
and significant loss of life is 
occurring or threatened.
Genocide. 
 
Crimes against 
humanity. 
 
War crimes. 
 
Ethnic cleansing.  
Level of State 
Involvement in 
Atrocities 
 
“[D]eliberate state action, 
or state neglect or inability 
to act, or a failed state 
situation . . . .” 
“[N]ational 
authorities are 
manifestly failing to 
protect their 
populations . . . .” 
Last Resort “Every diplomatic and non-
military avenue  . . . must 
have been explored . . . 
there must be reasonable 
grounds for believing that, 
in all circumstances, it the 
measure had been 
“. . . should 
peaceful means be 
inadequate . . .” 
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attempted it would not have 
succeeded . . . .”
Right Intention “The primary purpose of 
the intervention must be to 
halt or avert human 
suffering.”
No mention of right 
intention. 
Proportionality “The scale, duration and 
intensity of the planned 
military intervention should 
be the minimum necessary 
to secure the humanitarian 
objective in question.”
No mention of 
proportionality.  
Nature of the 
Obligation 
The international 
community has a “fallback 
responsibility” to protect 
when states are unable or 
unwilling to fulfill their 
responsibility to protect. 
 
“[T]here are exceptional 
circumstances in which the 
very interest that all states 
have in maintaining a stable 
international order requires 
them to react.”
The international 
community is 
“prepared to take 
collective action …” 
“[O]n a case-by-case 
basis” 
Proper Authority  UN Security Council + 
Encouraging P5 not to 
exercise veto power in 
humanitarian crises. 
 
UN General Assembly 
through the Uniting for 
Peace mechanism. 
 
Regional organizations + 
Seeking ex post facto 
authorization.
UN Security 
Council only.  
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The tale of the twists and turns of the negotiations at the 
World Summit that led to this outcome, which as 
aforementioned was adopted by consensus, has been told 
elsewhere and need not be recounted here in full.327 A few 
observations, however, are noteworthy. First, contrary to popular 
perception,328 the debate over RtoP did not pit liberal western 
democracies eager to secure maximum protection for human 
rights against illiberal states or former colonies resistant to any 
diminution of their sovereignty. The picture is more complex.329 
Those aspects of RtoP-Humanity’s Version that challenged the 
existing jus ad bellum scheme were jettisoned due to reservations 
expressed by Great Powers, western and non-western 
democracies, illiberal states, and small underdeveloped 
countries. Second, despite the fact that it was the fear of a 
double Russo-Chinese veto that led NATO to launch Operation 
Allied Force without seeking Security Council approval, the P5, 
regardless of their domestic regime-type, were unanimous in 
rejecting any constraints on their freedom to exercise their 
coveted veto power.330 Third, although the Rwandan genocide 
demonstrated that occasionally it is not the threat of a P5 veto 
but rather international apathy and a lack of political will that 
lead to human tragedies,331 the overwhelming majority of 
countries rejected proposals to make armed intervention in 
humanitarian crises mandatory. For powers with force-
projection capabilities necessary for waging humanitarian war, a 
hard-and-fast rule requiring intervention to prevent mass 
atrocities would have placed the burden of responding to these 
crises on these countries and would have subjected them to 
increased pressure to intervene in situations where their 
                                                                                                                                     
327. A thorough and well-written account appears in ALEX BELLAMY, 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 83–91 (2009). 
328. See e.g., Claire Applegarth & Andrew Block, Acting Against Atrocities: A Strategy 
for Supporters of the Responsibility to Protect 26 (Kennedy School of Government, Belfer 
Ctr. Student Paper Series #09-03), available at, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/xstandard/Student%20discussion%20paper%200903%20full.pdf 
329. See: Edward Luck, Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 GLOBAL 
RESP. TO PROTECT 10, 11 (2009). 
330. Alex Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention 
and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 143, 164 (2006). 
331. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE (2003); ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF 
HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004). 
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interests are not necessarily implicated. Smaller nations also 
expressed concerns regarding an expansive version of RtoP. On 
the other hand, For many of these countries, codifying an 
obligation to forcefully prevent mass atrocities could be misused 
by powerful countries to intervene in their internal affairs.332 
Fourth, the vast majority of countries333 were reluctant to 
contemplate granting any institution other than the Security 
Council the power to authorize the resort to force for 
humanitarian purposes. For Russia and China, this would have 
significantly devalued their P5 status, while for smaller states, 
insisting on Security Council approval was a mechanism to 
guard against western interventionism.334 
In essence, therefore, we had come full circle. In 
September 1999, Kofi Annan called for the development of a 
strategy that would both guarantee effective action to forestall 
humanitarian tragedies caused by international complacency, 
such as the Rwandan genocide, while avoiding undermining the 
post-World War II international legal order as NATO’s illegal 
intervention in Kosovo threatened to do. After an extended 
diplomatic and academic debate during which numerous 
approaches to justify humanitarian war were proposed, in 2005 a 
choice was made to reaffirm and endorse the jus ad bellum 
                                                                                                                                     
332. Andreas Zimmerman, The Obligation to Prevent Genocide: Towards a General 
Responsibility to Protect?, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 629, 631–32. The US position in this 
regard was the clearest. In a letter addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the 
UN member states, US Ambassador John Bolton stated: 
[T]he Charter has never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for 
Security Council members to support enforcement action in various cases 
involving serious breaches of international peace . . . We do not accept that 
either the United Nations as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual 
states, have an obligation to intervene under international law. We also 
believe that what the United Nations does in a particular situation should 
depend on the specific circumstances. Accordingly, we should avoid language 
that focuses on the obligation or responsibility of the international 
community and instead assert that we are prepared to take action.  
Letter from Ambassador John Bolton, United States, to UN Permanent Representatives 
(Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with author). 
333. The Untied States and United Kingdom, however, adopted the position that 
the unilateral use of force is not proscribed by international law. The impact of this 
position does not appear in the paragraphs relating to RtoP, but in paragraphs 79 and 
80 on the Security Council’s role in authorizing the use of force. 
334. BELLAMY, supra note 166, at 83. 
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scheme as enshrined in the UN Charter.335 In other words, 
should a situation arise where incontrovertible evidence 
indicates that mass atrocities are being perpetrated, such as 
Darfur or the Syrian civil war,336 forceful intervention to protect 
civilians remains, as it was since 1945, dependent on the 
approval of the Security Council, which ultimately hinges on the 
consent of the P5. This is why I call the version of RtoP adopted 
by the 2005 World Summit: RtoP-Realpolitik. 
Despite the deliberate choice that RtoP-Realpolitik 
represents in favor of the existing rules and institutions of jus ad 
bellum that are predicated on the values and purposes of the law 
of coexistence, many scholars applauded the adoption of RtoP 
by the World Summit and portrayed it as evidence of the 
humanization of international law and global affairs. So much so 
that RtoP has been described as the “most dramatic normative 
development of our time,”337 as embodying “an emerging 
constitutional norm,”338 and even as portending a “revolution in 
the consciousness of international relations.”339 These 
celebratory appraisals of RtoP, much like rejectionist views that 
condemn this concept as an attempt to resuscitate bygone 
pretexts for western colonization,340 are unwarranted.341 Not 
                                                                                                                                     
335. William Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME 
27 (Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2012). 
336. On the conflict in Darfur, see REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION 
OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL ESTABLISHED 
PURSUANT TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1564 (2004), available at http://
www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (concluding that the Government 
of Sudan was responsible for acts that may amount to crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, and finding that rebel forces also perpetrated violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law that may amount to war crimes). On the conflict in Syria, 
see what, at the time of this writing, is the latest report prepared by a Commission of 
Inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council, which documents the 
perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity. See Report of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human Rights 
Council, June 4, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (2013). 
337. Thakur & Weiss, supra note 306, at 23. 
338. Peters, supra note 73, at 189. 
339. Christopher Joyner, “The Responsibility to Protect”: Humanitarian Concern and 
the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 693, 720 (2007). 
340. See e.g., Mohamed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, 6 
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 81, 84 (2002) (arguing that RtoP bears the features of the ‘standard 
of civilization’ that provided a pretext for European colonization). 
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only does RtoP-Realpolitik entrust the Security Council, which is 
ultimately a Great Power oligarchy, with the authority to wage 
humanitarian war, it also institutionalizes what Samantha Power, 
a leading champion of humanitarianism and the current US 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, critically 
dubbed as “a la cartism” in dealing with humanitarian crises.342 
Regardless of the nature of the unfolding human tragedy, 
nothing in RtoP-Realpolitik, as has been the case since the entry 
into force of the UN Charter in 1945, requires international 
intervention to prevent or halt mass atrocities. 
If anything, RtoP-Realpolitik appears to be purposefully 
designed to operate within the limits of the UN collective 
security apparatus established in the aftermath of World War II. 
Collective security, in its ideal form, obliges states to “abide by 
certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when 
necessary, band together to stop aggression.”343 In other words, 
states participating in such a system view security as indivisible, 
agree to consider threats or acts of aggression against any state 
as aimed at all states, and make an a priori commitment to 
unconditionally aid victims and subdue aggressors. In a sense, 
therefore, under ideal collective security, the very definition of 
security is transformed. Formerly antagonistic coequal 
sovereigns perceive their individual security, and perhaps even 
their survival, as intertwined with that of the collectivity, thereby 
establishing what may be termed a genuine security 
community.344 
                                                                                                                                     
341. See: MICHAEL SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES 177 (2013) (discussing 
the limited changes in the existing structure of jus ad bellum caused by the adoption of 
RtoP.) 
342. Samantha Power, Force Full, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2003), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/srebenica-liberalism-balkan-united%20nations 
343. Charles Kupchan & Clifford Kupchan, The Promise of Collective Security, 20 
INT’L SECURITY 52, 52–53 (1995). 
344. The term ‘security community’ was first introduced by Karl Deutsch to 
denote a situation where the security of states becomes so intertwined and 
interdependent to the extent that these states feel assured that they will never be 
subjected to attacks from other members of the community and that all disputes will be 
peacefully settled. See KARL DEUTSCH ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC AREA 3–6 (1957). 
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The United Nations, however, was neither intended nor has 
it functioned as an ideal collective security system.345 Rather, as 
John Ruggie remarks, “the UN design may be described as a 
concert placed within a collective security organization.”346 
Unlike ideal collective security, a concert does not entail 
binding commitments or codified obligations to protect victims 
of aggression or vindicate legal rights. Furthermore, a concert 
does not expunge power politics or competition among its 
participants. In fact, it is driven by Great Powers and functions 
on the basis of consensus between these most influential 
players.347 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the sine qua non for the 
successful operation of such an arrangement is the convergence 
of the views and interests of the Great Powers, which, as the 
historical record demonstrates, is a transient state of affairs.348 
These differences between ideal collective security and the 
concert-like UN security apparatus are comparable to the 
disparities distinguishing RtoP-Humanity’s Version from RtoP-
Realpolitik detailed above. More fundamentally, the divergence 
between, on one side, ideal collective security and RtoP--
Humanity’s Version, and on the other side, Great Power concert 
and RtoP-Realpolitik, are reflective of commitments to 
contrasting worldviews and normative projects. While I do risk 
painting these concepts with a rather broad brush, ideal 
collective security and RtoP-Humanity’s Version, like global 
constitutionalism and the humanitarian thesis, ultimately 
operate on the foundation of a communitarian post-nation state 
image of the world.349 Whenever the principal beneficiary of 
security is identified as a collectivity beyond the state, be it a 
region, the entire world, or humanity, or when it is argued that 
                                                                                                                                     
345. Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the 
United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 789 (1948) (concluding that “[t]he Charter is far 
from fulfilling these requirements”). 
346. John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT’L 
ORG. 561, 587 (1992); see John Gerard Ruggie, The False Premise of Realism, 20 INT’L 
SECURITY 62, 63 (1995) (describing how since its inception the United Nations was 
imagined as “a collective security organization based in a concert of power, to be used 
by, but not against, the permanent members of the Security Council”). 
347. Charles Kupchan & Clifford Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the 
Future of Europe, 16 INT’L SECURITY 114, 120 (1991). 
348. Ernst B. Haas, Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational 
Concepts, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40 (1955). 
349. See supra notes 306–16 and accompanying text. 
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the international legal system has evolved into a hierarchical 
order predicated on humanitarian values, the impact of these 
intellectual moves is to challenge the primacy of the sovereign 
state as the leading actor in international affairs. 
A security system based on a Great Power concert, however, 
is “a means of enforcing order between independent political 
communities [and] of achieving a degree of centralization that 
does not radically threaten the independence and autonomy of states.”350 
A concert, therefore, is a political arrangement that, like the law 
of coexistence,351 seeks to minimize conflict and manage 
relations between territorially disjoint, coequal sovereigns 
inhabiting an insecure world. It achieves this purpose by 
entrusting the most powerful states with special responsibilities 
in administering inter-state relations and maintaining stability in 
global politics. RtoP-Realpolitik is designed to operate within the 
bounds of this Great Power concert. 
These are the limits of RtoP, and indeed, of 
humanitarianism in our contemporary world. Waging war to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities, including crimes shocking 
the conscious of humanity, remains subservient to and 
dependent on the vagaries and uncertainties of Great Power 
politics. 
It appears, therefore, that the conscious choice made in 
2005 to adopt RtoP-Realpolitik, despite the presence of numerous 
alternatives, including RtoP-Humanity’s Version, casts doubts over 
claims that international law, especially jus ad bellum, is 
undergoing a systematic process of humanization whereby the 
telos of the international legal order is becoming the promotion, 
protection, and fulfillment of human security, rights, needs, and 
interests. Nothing in RtoP-Realpolitik, and the Great Power 
concert within which it functions, corroborates what proponents 
of the humanitarian thesis depict as a revolution in the nature of 
international law or a change in its deep structure.352 Rather, it 
appears that the law of coexistence with its emphasis on 
protecting state security and maintaining inter-state peace and 
                                                                                                                                     
350. Andrew Hurrell, Collective Security and International Order Revisited, 11 INT’L 
REL. 37, 41 (1992) (emphasis added). 
351. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
352. See supra notes 340–50 and accompanying text. 
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stability, as opposed to human security, continues to constitute 
the underlying objectives and purposes of jus ad bellum.353 
This conclusion should not, however, be read as suggesting 
that the adoption of RtoP by the 2005 World Summit, even if in 
attenuated form, was wholly inconsequential. Although RtoP-
Realpolitik neither establishes novel legal rights or obligations 
nor challenges the fundamental features of the existing jus ad 
bellum scheme, it does express an endorsement of the expansion 
that occurred in the Security Council’s definition of threats to 
and breaches of the peace.354 Since the early-1990s, the Security 
Council repeatedly found that internal conflicts or domestic 
strife, even if not causing regional repercussions, constitute 
threats to or breaches of the peace that warrant authorizing 
forceful intervention.355 The adoption of RtoP indicates that this 
practice has become firmly established. It also demonstrates that 
the protection of civilians from mass atrocities per se, regardless 
of whether it entails transboundary ramifications or causes inter-
state tensions, has become recognized as a legitimate policy 
objective to be pursued by the Security Council.356 
Furthermore, since its adoption in 2005, RtoP has gradually 
become streamlined into UN practice and discourse.357 This has 
been propelled by repeated references to RtoP in Security 
Council discussions and resolutions,358 the issuance by the 
                                                                                                                                     
353. After undertaking a review of developments throughout the entire corpus of 
international law, Bruno Simma notes that despite the undeniable shift of international 
law from a minimalist law of coexistence towards community law, “[O]ne must not 
forget that traditionally patterned, bilateralist international law still constitutes the basis 
on which the new developments are taking shape—and a rather pertinacious basis at 
that.” Simma, supra note 64, at 229–30. 
354. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
355. Bruce Cronin, International Consensus and the Changing Legal Authority of the 
UN Security Council, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 57 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008). 
356. Jon Western & Joshua S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: 
Lessons From Somalia to Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 48, 54–55 (2011). 
357. Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 143 (2010). 
358. UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) was the first to cite RtoP. In 
addition, UN member states exchanged views on implementing RtoP during the 
annual debates held by the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict. For excerpts of the positions expressed on RtoP during these debates, see 
Security Council Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, International Coalition 
for the Responsibility to Protect (May 10, 2011), http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/
rtop-statements_docms-poc-may-2011.pdf. 
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Secretary General of reports elaborating its scope, content, and 
methods of operationalization,359 and the convening of General 
Assembly debates on its implementation.360 This contributed to 
the gradual transformation of RtoP from a relatively novel and 
contentious concept into a recognized policy framework for 
guiding UN responses to mass atrocities.361 
The cumulative impact of this entrenchment of RtoP is 
that, even if restricted to whatever course of action is politically 
feasible within a Great Power concert, it has become harder for 
the society of states to turn a blind eye to threatened or ongoing 
atrocities. Although RtoP neither obliges nor guarantees either 
forceful or even diplomatic intervention to protect civilians, it is 
among the factors that contribute to generating a felt need and 
creating palpable pressure both on the Great Powers and the 
broader UN membership to take measures to protect civilians.362 
The international reaction to the Libyan and Syrian civil 
wars, although strikingly different, bears out the forgoing 
observations about both the UN collective security apparatus 
and RtoP-Realpolitik. In responding to both these crises, the 
Security Council, in keeping with its purpose and design, acted 
as a Great Power concert. Nothing in the Charter or in RtoP 
obliged the Council to examine either of these conflicts or to 
take any measures to protect civilians against mass atrocities. 
Instead, whether these conflicts were brought before the 
                                                                                                                                     
359. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued two reports outlining the various 
aspects of RtoP and proposing approaches to implementing the concept. The first 
report, issued in 2009, was U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). In 2010, the 
Secretary General issued a follow-up report: U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, 
Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/64/864 (July 14, 2010). 
360. The General Assembly held two debates on the aforementioned reports of 
the Secretary General. As one observer noted, these debates indicated “a growing 
political consensus in support of the Responsibility to Protect . . . states are willing to 
accept the relatively minimalist construction of the Responsibility to Protect outlined in 
the World Summit Outcome Document . . .” Burke-White, supra note 335, at 33. 
361. Alex J. Bellamy, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the 
Norm, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 263 (2011). 
362. Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the 
Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 279, 282 
(2011) (arguing that “the true significance of RtoP is not in creating new rights or 
obligations to do ‘the right thing’; rather, it is in making it harder to do to the wrong 
thing or nothing at all”). 
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Council and the nature of its response principally depended on 
the positions of the P5. In addition, the glaring discrepancy 
between the Council’s authorization of the use of force to 
protect civilians in the Libyan case and its failure for over two 
years to even pass a resolution censuring the Assad regime in 
Syria is partially imputable to the choice made during the 2005 
World Summit.363 By leaving the Council’s unlimited margin of 
appreciation untouched and ensuring that the P5’s influence 
remained unscathed, RtoP-Realpolitik effectively codified and 
institutionalized the Council’s policy of pragmatic “ad hocism”364 
in dealing with humanitarian crises. Waging war to prevent mass 
human suffering, regardless of the egregiousness of the 
atrocities, continues to hinge—as it has since 1945—on the 
consent of the P5, and pursuing the humanitarian value of 
saving lives continues to operate within the restrictive bounds of 
the politically feasible in a world dominated by the Great 
Powers. 
Nonetheless, these crises also demonstrate the impact RtoP, 
even in its severely mitigated form, has had on international 
debates on the prevention of mass atrocities. Never during 
deliberations held at the United Nations or elsewhere on the 
Libyan or Syrian conflicts was the responsibility of governments 
to prevent the perpetration of the most heinous crimes 
questioned. In other words, this core commitment contained in 
RtoP, which echoes broader customary obligations emanating 
from human rights and humanitarian law,365 continues to enjoy 
global support. Indeed, discussions principally centered on the 
appropriate response of the international community to the 
deteriorating situations in those two countries. In other words, 
the debate has shifted from whether the international community 
should do anything to prevent mass atrocities to what should be 
                                                                                                                                     
363. I say partially because the strategic interests of the Great Powers undoubtedly 
played the central role in determining the outcomes of Security Council deliberations 
on Syria. It remains, however, that the fact that RtoP as adopted by the 2005 World 
Summit stated that situations in which mass atrocities were being perpetrated would be 
examined, essentially, “on a case-by-case basis.”  
364. Andrea Bianchi, Ad-Hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 263, 269–70 
(2002). 
365. Stahn, supra note 325, at 107. 
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done.366 This shift is partially imputable to RtoP, which 
contributed to structuring international debates on these 
matters and excluded certain policy options, such as turning a 
blind eye to ongoing atrocities, that had become untenable. 
CONCLUSION 
Speaking on her final day as US Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, Susan Rice criticized the Security Council 
for failing to protect Syrian civilians and condemned the 
Council’s inaction due to Russo-Chinese vetoes as “a moral and 
strategic disgrace that history will judge harshly.”367 Whether the 
Council’s posture towards the Syrian civil war constitutes a 
“moral and strategic disgrace” is a subjective assessment which 
readers may or may not agree with. 
The assertion, however, that the Security Council failed is a 
different matter. In this Article, I argued that the Security 
Council was conceived and continues to operate as a Great 
Power concert, not as an enforcer of either international law or 
morality. Nothing in the UN Charter or elsewhere obliges the 
Council to either deliberate on or authorize enforcement 
measures in response to any situation that threatens world 
peace, whether caused by an inter-state dispute or a domestic 
crisis, and whatever its human toll. In the aftermath of NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo, however, an opportunity appeared to 
revisit the doctrinal and institutional architecture governing the 
use of force in international relations. A gap had opened 
between the legality forged by the victorious Great Powers of 
World War II and an emergent humanitarian legitimacy that 
privileges universal human values. In a bid to bridge this gap, 
RtoP-Humanity’s Version was advanced as a holistic policy 
framework to guide international intervention to prevent mass 
atrocities. If adopted, RtoP-Humanity’s Version would have 
instituted considerable restraints both on the limitless 
institutional discretion of the Security Council and the 
                                                                                                                                     
366. Mohamed Helal & Philippe Kirsch, Case Studies: Libya, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming May 2014). 
367. Susan E. Rice, Remarks at the Security Council Stakeout (June 25, 2013), 
available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/211134.htm. 
2014] THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM 641 
unmatched influence of the P5 when confronted with grave 
humanitarian crises. 
More profoundly, had this bid to alter the doctrinal and 
institutional components of jus ad bellum succeeded, it would 
have portended a perceptible shift in the core values and 
purposes of international law.368 Traditionally, international law 
operated as a set of rules that facilitated the peaceful 
coexistence of coequal sovereigns in an anarchic world order. 
RtoP-Humanity’s Version, however, represented an attempt to 
relegate the state, its interests, security, and survival to the 
background, and prioritize human security, interests, and 
welfare as the overarching purposes of international law. 
Ultimately, however, a version of RtoP prevailed that left 
the fundamental features of jus ad bellum intact. RtoP-Realpolitik, 
as I have called the outcome of the 2005 World Summit, 
represents a deliberate choice in favor of preserving the Security 
Council’s broad margin of appreciation and making the 
protection of civilians against the most egregious crimes 
contingent on the consent of the P5. Indeed, humanitarian 
crises are to be dealt with like any source of insecurity in the 
world or any matter on the Council’s agenda, be it global 
terrorism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmir, HIV-AIDS in Africa, 
territorial disputes, or the relatively mundane regular renewal of 
UN peacekeeping operations. This means that RtoP-Realpolitik 
reaffirmed the original understanding underlying the 
establishment of the Security Council in 1945: that this political 
body par excellence would maintain peace and security without 
impinging on whatever the P5 perceive as constituting their vital 
interests, thereby contributing to the continued peaceful 
coexistence between these Great Powers. 
Thus, it appears that, contrary to Ambassador Rice’s claim, 
when it came to Syria, even if in a grotesquely perverted way, the 
Security Council succeeded in executing its mandate. Russian 
                                                                                                                                     
368. Martha Finnemore argued that “[h]ow force is used among members of a 
society, by whom, and to what purpose reveal a great deal about the nature of authority 
in the group and the ends that its members value.” MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE 
OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE 1 (2003). In other 
words, the values underpinning jus ad bellum and the social purposes it pursues serve as 
a seismograph of sorts for the values of the entire international legal order. Therefore, 
a change in the values and purposes underlying jus ad bellum would certainly signify a 
shift in the overarching telos of the international legal order. 
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strategic interests in Syria were unharmed and any settlement to 
the conflict remains dependent on Great Power agreement. This 
challenges claims that jus ad bellum is undergoing a profound 
process of humanization. The failure to overthrow the dominant 
statist values of jus ad bellum and making the pursuit of 
humanitarian objectives dependent on the uncertainties of 
Great Power politics, casts doubts over the extent to which 
humanitarianism is becoming recognized as the telos of this field 
of international law. The fact that, when given the opportunity, 
the international community consciously chose to reaffirm rules 
and institutions that reflect statist values suggests that 
humanitarian values are not progressively becoming the globally 
dominant values. This also indicates that, contrary to accounts 
proclaiming the rise of humanity’s law and the emergence of a 
community of humankind governed by the rule of law, world 
politics remains an anarchical realm of competitive, mutually 
exclusive, self-regarding states, and that humanitarianism 
functions within the limits of this highly politicized world. 
 
